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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
Case No. 890202-CA
Priority #2

GILBERTO GONZALES,
Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The defendant, GILBERTO GONZALES, was arrested on August 4,
1988, and charged with Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, a
class B misdemeanor.

See §41-6-44, Utah Code Ann. (1988).

On

August 17, 1988, the case (Justice Court No. 2-1984-98A) was filed
by the Salt Lake County Attorney in the Second Precinct Justice
Court for Salt Lake County.

On October 18, 1988, a hearing was held

in that court on the defendant's Motion to Instruct the jury on
"defense of justification."

See §76-2-401, Utah Code Ann. (1978).

Both parties subsequently submitted memoranda on the Motion.

The

Honorable Phyllis J. Scott, presiding Justice of the Peace, denied
the defendant's Motion to Instruct.
Based on advice of counsel and the Justice Court's denial
of the defendant's pretrial Motion, Mr. Gonzales entered a
"conditional" plea of "no contest" to the charge on April 25, 1989.
See, e.g., State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah App. 1988)

(Conditional plea of "no contest" was sensible and sound way to
preserve suppression issue for appeal after denial of Motion in
District Court).

The defendant, through counsel, stated in court at

that time that the purpose of the "no contest" plea was to appeal
the justice court's denial of the defendant's Motion to Instruct.
No trial was held in the justice court.

W.C. Gwynn, Deputy County

Attorney, agreed to the conditional plea in court at that time.
A Notice of Appeal was filed in the justice court on April
28, 1989.

The case was transferred to the Third Circuit Court (Cir.

Ct. No. 892004016TC), Murray City Department.

The defendant timely

filed a written Motion to Instruct the jury on defense of
justification with a supporting memorandum in the circuit court.
Maurice D. Jones, presiding judge, refused to rule on the Motion
prior to trial.
On July 14, 1989, the first and only trial in this case was
held in the circuit court. After the State and defense had rested,
Judge Jones denied the defendant's Motion to Instruct the jury on
defense of justification.

Judge Jones ruled that there was an

insufficient factual basis to support the instruction.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty to the charge of
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol.
defendant that day to:

Judge Jones sentenced the

(1) 60 days in jail, with 57 suspended upon

completion of probation, and three suspended for 24 hours of
community service; (2) $480 fine to be paid within 60 days;
$120 fine surcharge to be paid within 60 days;

(3)

(4) $100 victim

restitution fund assessment to be paid within 60 days;

(5) $50

alcohol rehabilitation fee to be paid within 60 days;
attorney fee to be paid within 60 days; and

(6) $150

(7) six months

probation supervised by the Alcohol Counseling and Education Center.
On July 31, 1989, the defendant filed a Notice of Appeal
(Ct. App. No. 890202CA).

On August 11, 1989, the defendant filed a

Motion to Amend the sentence in the Circuit Court.

Judge Jones

refused to rule on the Motion for lack of jurisdiction.
The defendant applied to the circuit court for a
Certificate of Probable Cause to stay the sentence pending appeal.
Judge Jones declined to schedule a hearing or issue on Order.

There

are no written findings of fact nor conclusions of law in this
matter and the basis of the circuit court's action is unclear.

The

defendant then applied to the Court of Appeals for a Certificate of
Probable Cause which was issued by the Court on November 20, 1989.
See Addendum A.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND ARGUMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to
§78-2a-3(2)(d), Utah Code Ann. (1989), whereby a defendant in a
criminal case may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a
final judgment in a circuit court.

ARGUMENT
JURISDICTION IS NOT DENIED UNDER
§77-35-26(13)(a), UTAH CODE ANN. (1989),
PURSUANT TO THE RULING IN CITY OF MONTICELLO
V. CHRISTENSEN, 769 P.2d 853 (Utah App. 1989) .

POINT A
MONTICELLO DOES NOT APPLY TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE
In City of Monticello v. Christensen, 769 P.2d 853 (Utah
App. 1989), defendant Christensen was convicted of driving without a
valid Utah license after a trial in the justice court.

He appealed,

and was again convicted of the charge after a trial de novo in the
circuit court.

In the case at bar, however, Mr. Gonzales never had

a trial in the justice court.

He entered a conditional plea of "no

contest" because his pretrial Motion to Instruct was denied.

Thus,

Mr. Gonzales, unlike Christensen, has not fully realized his right
to appeal via trial de novo because the only issue reconsidered in
the circuit court was the pretrial Motion.

See Utah Const, art.

VIII, §5 (1989); see also §§78-4-7.5 (1989) and 78-5-14 (1987).
Dismissal of his case by the Court of Appeals would deny Mr.
Gonzales his right to appeal.

See Utah Const, art. I, §12.

The rationale of Monticello is that under §77-35-26(13)(a)
"an appeal from the justice court affords defendant a trial 'anew1
in the circuit court . . .n

769 P.2d at 854.

not apply to the facts in the case at bar.

This rationale does

For this reason

Monticello is distinguishable and should not deny the Court of
Appeals jurisdiction to review the case at bar.
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POINT B
SECTION 77-35-26(13)(a) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS
APPLIED TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE•
Justice courts and circuit courts in Utah have concurrent
original jurisdiction over class B misdemeanors, including DUI
charges filed under Article 5 of Chapter 6 of Title 41 of the Utah
Code.

Se£ §§78-4-5(1)(a)(1989), 78-4-5(1)(1987), and 78-5-4(1987),

Utah Code Ann.

Thus, the charge against Mr. Gonzales could have

been filed originally in the Third Circuit Court rather than the
Second Precinct Justice Court.

Had the case been filed in circuit

court, Mr. Gonzales would be entitled under Utah law to appeal
judgments rendered there to the Court of Appeals.

See Utah Const,

art. I, §12, and §78-4-11, Utah Code Ann. (1987).

Mr. Gonzales

would be denied review by the Court of Appeals under
§77-35-26(13)(a), Utah Code Ann. (1989), solely because the case was
filed originally in a justice court.

1.

AS APPLIED, §77-35-26(13)(a) DENIES MR. GONZALES HIS

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO APPEAL.

Article I, §12 of the Utah

Constitution guarantees that "In criminal prosecutions the accused
shall have . . . the right to appeal in all cases."

On the facts of

this case §77-35-26(13)(a) would deny Mr. Gonzales his right to
appeal the judgments of the trial court, that is, the circuit court,
because the only judgment from the justice court subjected to
reconsideration in the circuit court was the pretrial Motion to
Instruct the jury.
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2.

AS APPLIED, §77-35-26(13)(a) VIOLATES EQUAL

PROTECTION OF LAWS.
states:

Article I, §24 of the Utah Constitution

"All laws of a general nature shall have uniform

operation."

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution prohibits any state from enacting laws that deny "any
person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the law."
Under Article I, §24 of the Utah Constitution, (1) laws
must apply equally to all persons within a class, and (2) statutory
classifications and the different treatment given the classes must
be based on differences that have a reasonable tendency to further
the objectives of the statute.
(Utah 1984).

Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670

In the case at bar, the relevant class is people

charged with class B DUI under §41-6-44, Utah Code Ann. (1988).
Members of the class are treated differently under §77-35-26(13)(a)
depending on whether the charge is filed in justice court or circuit
court.

Under the facts of this case, Mr. Gonzales would be denied

his right to appeal the judgments of the trial court because his
case was filed originally in a justice court.

Section

77-35-26(13)(a) fails the Malan test because filing venue is
arbitrary and within the unfettered discretion of the prosecuting
agencies.

Further, it is contrary to public policy by encouraging

forum shopping by prosecutors.

Assuming the objective of

§77-35-26(13)(a) is judicial economy, the Rule again fails Malan as
applied to this case because the State's interest in judicial
economy is reduced since Mr. Gonzales never had a trial in the

-6 -

justice court.

693 p.2d at 671. C_f., Monticello, 769 P.2d 853

(Defendant convicted after trial in justice court and again after
trial de novo in circuit court).
Although there is no federal constitutional right to
appeal, under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution an appeal "cannot be granted to some litigants and
capriciously or arbitrarily denied to others without violating the
Equal Protection Clause."
Ed. 2d 36 (1972).

Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 77, 31 L

Under the facts of this case, justice court

filing venue is arbitrary, and §77-35-26(13)(a) would effectively
deny Mr. Gonzales an appeal from the judgments of the trial court,
that is, the circuit court.

This violates equal protection under

the Federal Constitution because §77-35-26(13)(a) would not apply
had this case been originally filed in the circuit court.

3.
LAW.

AS APPLIED, §77-35-26(13)(a) VIOLATES DUE PROCESS OF

Article I, §7 of the Utah Constitution guarantees that "no

person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law."

Because §77-35-26(13)(a) would deny Mr. Gonzales

his constitutional right to appeal, due process requires that the
reasonableness of the statutory scheme outweigh the degree of
intrusion upon Mr. Gonzales1 rights. Condemarin v. University
Hospital, 107 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 12 (Utah 1989).

Due process of law is also guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment, §1, to the Federal Constitution.

The United States

Supreme Court has stated that due process requires "that the law
shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the
means selected shall have a reasonable and substantial relation to
the objective sought to be attained."

Pruneyard Shopping Center v.

Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 85, 64 L.Ed. 2d 741, 754 (1980)(quoting Nebbia
v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934)).
Assuming that the objective of §77-35-26(13)(a) is judicial
economy, the statute violates due process under state and federal
standards because it arbitrarily denies Mr,, Gonzales the right to
appeal his trial while others similarly charged are not so denied.
There is no reasonable basis in the statutory scheme for this
result; rather, it is within the unfettered discretion of the
prosecutors based on where they decide to file the charge.

Further,

the degree of intrusion upon Mr. Gonzales1 rights is substantial
because he would be denied his right to appeal the judgments and
orders of the trial court, while the State's interest in judicial
economy is reduced since he never had a trial in the justice court.

CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals should not dismiss Mr. Gonzales1
appeal for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to the ruling in City of
Monticello v. Christensen because that case is distinguished on its
facts.

Because Mr. Gonzales never had a trial in the justice court,
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the underlying rationale of Monticello —

that an appeal from the

justice court affords a defendant a trial anew in the circuit
court —

does not apply to the facts of Mr, Gonzales1 case.
Further, as applied to these facts, dismissal of his appeal

would deny Mr. Gonzales his constitutional right to appeal and would
violate his rights of due process and equal protection guaranteed by
the Utah and United States constitutions.

For all of the foregoing

reasons the defendant respectfully requests that the Court of
Appeals acknowledge jurisdiction to consider his appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On August 4, 1988, at approximately 12:35 a.m. Deputy Fred
Baird of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's office observed a
brown-colored vehicle traveling westbound in the center turn-lane in
the vicinity of 300 East on 3900 South in Salt Lake City.
(T: 37-38).

Deputy Baird activated the overhead lights on his

vehicle west of State Street, and the brown-colored vehicle pulled
over at about 250 West and 3900 South.

(T: 42). The only person in

the car was the driver, Gilberto Gonzales.

(T: 43). Deputy Baird

approached the vehicle and spoke to Mr. Gonzales through an open
window.

Mr. Gonzales told him that he was trying to find his son

Walter who was very sick.
find Walter.

(T: 106). Deputy Baird refused to help

(T: 7 ) . Deputy Baird noticed an odor of alcohol and

slurred speach, and asked Mr. Gonzales to exit the vehicle to
perform field sobriety tests.

(T: 44). At about this time Deputy

Ken Davis arrived at the scene as a back-up officer.
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(T: 96).

Mr. Gonzales performed a "balance test," a "finger-counting
test," and a "hand-clap test."

(T: 48-49) . According to Deputy

Baird, Mr. Gonzales failed these tests.

Deputy Davis believed that

Mr. Gonzales "was intoxicated beyond the legal point" based on the
tests, although he could not remember how Mr. Gonzales performed on
the tests.

(T: 98; 99-101).

Deputy Baird then placed Mr. Gonzales

under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol and
transported him to the traffic office to perform a breath test for
blood-alcohol content.

(T:

50). Mr. Gonzales submitted to the

test which produced a result of .20 grams.

(T: 63).

Mr. Gonzales is a native of El Salvador.
English very well.

He does not speak

(T: 104). He resides in Kearns, Utah, with his

wife and his eighteen-year-old son Walter.

(T: 107). Mr. Gonzales

works as a housekeeping supervisor at the Hilton Hotel in Salt Lake
City from 11:00 p.m. to 7:30 a.m.
day of August 3, 1988, at home.

(T: 103). Mr. Gonzales spent the
He drank some beer at home between

the hours of 5:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m.

(T:

108-109).

At about

12:00 midnight Mr. Gonzales and his wife became alarmed because
their son had not returned home.

(T: 104-105).

Walter had left the

house at about 4:00 p.m., and when the last bus arrived at 12:00
midnight, Walter was not on it.

(T: 104). Between 12:00 midnight

and 12:15 a.m., Mr. Gonzales left the house and drove his car to a
dance club for minors near 2900 South in Salt Lake City, believing
that Walter might be there.

(T:

117). On prior occasions,

Mr. Gonzales had been able to find Walter when he failed to return
home.

(T:

116-117).

Mr. Gonzales then decided to return home, and

on the way was arrested by Deputy Baird.

(T: 105).

Walter is psychotic.

(T:

79). He was hospitalized from

September 9 to October 10, 1987, in the intensive treatment unit at
the Western Institute of Neuropsychiatry, which is a locked
treatment unit for severely disturbed psychotics who can be
dangerous to self or others.

(T: 84-85).

Walter's symptoms

included delusions, schizophrenia, auditory hallucinations, thought
insertion, ideas of reference, psycho-motor retardation, depression
and so on.

(T:

80-81).

He was then and still is under the

continuing care of Sayed Afroz, M.D., who has prescribed various
anti-psychotic medications.

(T: 81-82).

Walter has tried to hurt

himself in the past by swallowing things, and has gotten lost on
prior occasions.

(T:

115; 116). Mr. Gonzales was particularly

worried about Walter on August 3, 1988, because he did not feel well
and had been hearing voices that day, and Mr. Gonzales believed he
had gotten lost or in trouble or might have hurt himself or someone
else.

(T:

105; 118). Dr. Afroz believed that Walter's condition

was potentially dangerous, although he had no specific opinion as to
Walter's condition on August 3, 1988, not having seen him that day.
(T:

85; 87; 91). At 12:00 midnight the buses had stopped running

and nobody else was available to drive Mr. Gonzales to try to find
Walter.

(T: 106).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
The defendant contends that he was denied a fair trial and

that he was illegally sentenced.

First, the trial court's denial of

the defendant's Motion to Instruct the jury on his defense of
justification constitutes reversible error.
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Second, the trial

court's admission of documents—including the Intoxilyzer Checklist,
Affidavit and Receipt—and testimony of Deputy Davis without prior
notice to the defendant constitutes reversible error.

Third, the

sentence imposed by Judge Jones is illegal because it creates
conditions more severe than the prior sentence imposed by Justice of
the Peace Scott.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
BY REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE
DEFENSE OF JUSTIFICATION.
Due process guarantees the right of a criminally accused
person to present all competent evidence in his defense.

See U.S.

Const, amend XIV, SI; Utah Const, art. I, §12. Rule 19 of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Rule 4.4 of the Rules of Practice
in the District Courts and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah allow
parties to request instructions to the jury.

The Utah Supreme Court

has defined the right of a defendant to instruct the jury in a
criminal case:
. . . where the defendant has [1] asserted a
defense to justify or excuse the criminal
charge, and [2] where there is reasonable
basis in the evidence to support it, the
viability of defense then becomes a question
of fact and the jury should be charged
regarding it.
State v. Harding, 635 P.2d 33, 34 (Utah 1981).

A.

Justification is a legal defense.

Section 76-2-401 of

the Utah Code Annotated (1978) provides for "justification" as a
complete defense to criminal responsibility:

76-2-401. Justification as defense—When Allowed—
Conduct which is justified is a defense
to prosecution for any offense based on the
conduct. The defense of justification may
be claimed:
(1) When the actor's conduct is in defense
of persons or property under the
circumstances described in sections 76-2-402
through 76-2-406 of this part;
(2) When the actor's conduct is reasonable
and in fulfillment of his duties as a
governmental officer or employee;
(3) When the actor's conduct is reasonable
discipline of minors by parents, guardians,
teachers, or other persons in loco parentis;
(4) When the actor's conduct is reasonable
discipline of persons in custody under the
laws of the state;
(5) When the actor's conduct is justified
for any other reason under the laws of this
state.
Section 76-2-401 should be interpreted as authorizing the legal
defense of justification against the charge of driving under the
influence of alcohol.

First, the initial statutory language allows

the defense against "any offense," and subsections one through five
should not be interpreted as exclusive in the absence of disjunctive
or conjunctive language.

Second, subsections one and five should be

interpreted as allowing for the defense on the facts of this case.
In State v. Tuttle, 730 P.2d 630 (Utah 1986), the trial
court instructed the jury on the defendant's defense of compulsion
under §76-2-302, Utah Code Ann. (1978), agaisnt the charge of escape
from official custody.

The trial court, however, added three
-13-

qualifications to the instruction that were based on the Model Penal
Code.

In affirming the conviction, the Utah Supreme Court concluded

that the trial court properly modified the statutory defense:

The duress defense as enacted in Utah's
current criminal code simply states the
broadest contours of the defense as it might
be raised against a criminal charge.
Nothing in the 1973 Utah legislative history
or in the commentary to the Model Penal Code
indicates that the new code was intended to
abolish subtle yet sound common law
qualifications upon the defense as it
relates to specific crimes that are
consistent with its essential nature and
that do not otherwise conflict with the
provisions or the purposes of the new
criminal code.
Id. at 633. Justification and compulsion are related statutory and
common-law defenses.

In the case at bar, the defendant's

justification instruction (see Addendum B) is properly based on the
Model Penal Code §3.02 and Comments (see Addendum C ) :
(a) the harm or evil sought to be avoided
by such conduct is greater than that sought
to be prevented by the law defining the
offense charged; and
(b) neither Code nor other law defining the
offense provides exceptions or defenses
dealing with the specific situation
involved; and
(c) a legislative purpose to exclude the
justification claimed does not otherwise
plainly appear.

-14-

Here, the State did not object to the wording of the
justification instruction.

The State did not propose an alternative

justification instruction, nor did the trial court.

The trial court

simply ruled that there was inadequate evidence based on Tuttle,
supra, to give the instruction because there may have been "a
reasonable and legal alternative to violating the law," and because
"the evidence [did] not support a finding of any threat or imminent
use of unlawful force against the defendant."

(T: 121). First, the

harm sought to be avoided need not be directed against the
defendant, but may, as here, be directed against a third person.
See, e.g., §76-2-401(1), Utah Code Ann. (1978).

Second, reasonable

evidence was presented by the defendant on these issues. By
refusing to instruct the jury the trial court usurped the jury's
fact-finding function and denied the defendant the benefit of a jury
trial.
Prejudice to the defendant in the court's refusal to
instruct was exacerbated first by the centrality of justification to
the defense (T: 152), and second by the prosecutor's comments during
closing argument:
MR. PARKER:
About five minutes? Thank you,
your Honor.
I would like, first of all, to encourage you
folks to take these instructions, first thing
when you get into the room and read through
all of them, and see if you ever find
mentioned anywhere in these instructions the
word "justification"—

-15-

MR. SCOWCROFT:
Your Honor, I object. I
object. I call for—
THE COURT:
Well, it's closing argument, he
has the right to cover the points you've
raised.
MR SCOWCROFT:
I—well, okay. I just want
that objection on the record, your Honor.
THE COURT:
All right, sir. But he does
have the right to cover the points you
raised.
MR. PARKER:
I ask you to try and find the
argument the defense counsel just gave
you.
Find where the Judge told you that if
some reason—if there was some reason for
the defendant driving, that somehow you can
excuse his conduct. You will not find it.
(T: 154).
B.

There is reasonable basis in the evidence to support

the defense of justification.

At trial, Mr. Gonzales testified that

he was alarmed because his son Walter had not returned home on the
last-running bus at midnight.

(T: 104-105).

According to

Mr. Gonzales and Dr. Afroz, Walter is mentally ill and potentially
dangerous to himself and others.

(T: 80-116).

Mr. Gonzales

testified that he had no alternative transportation to search for
Walter because buses had stopped running and nobody else was
available to drive him. (T:

106). Deputy Baird testified that he

refused to help Mr. Gonzales find Walter.

(T: 7 ) . These facts

could represent an imminent emergency that outweighs the harm of
Mr. Gonzales driving his car, particularly as here where Mr.
Gonzales' "driving pattern" did not present an immediate danger to
others.

(T: 66) .
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These facts create a "reasonable basis" in evidence to
instruct the jury on defense of justification.

The evidentiary

threshhold set forth in Harding should be high enough to prevent
irrelevant or confusing jury instructions, but low enough to allow
defendants to present a legal defense to a jury.

By refusing to

instruct the jury on justification, the trial court denied Mr.
Gonzales a fair trial and denied him the benefit of a jury trial
guaranteed by Article I, §12 of the Utah Constitution.

C.

The defense of justification has been recognized by

other courts.

In State v. Olson, 719 P.2d 55 (Or. App. 1986), the

Court of Appeals of Oregon overturned a conviction for driving under
the influence of intoxicants because the trial court refused to
instruct the jury on a "choice of evils" defense provided under
Oregon statute.

There, the passenger drove the car out of a traffic

intersection after the driver got out and walked away.

The

passenger was arrested and convicted for driving under the influence
of alcohol.

The court reasoned that the defendant was entitled to a

jury instruction based on the law:
Defendant's evidence was sufficient to support the
choice of evils defense and to require the
prosecution to rebut it. Whether the prosecution did
that is for the trial court's determination as the
fact-finder.
Id. at 57. The "choice of evils" defense is equivalent to the
defense of justification.

See Addendum D.

-17-

In State v. Pena, 197 Cal. Rptr. 264 (Cal. Super. 1983), a
California Appellate Court reversed a conviction for driving under
the influence of intoxicating liquor because the trial court refused
to instruct the jury regarding the defense of "justification."
There, the defendant pursued a sheriff's deputy by car at 4:00 a.m.
who had taken his girlfriend away under circumstances which
reasonably might have caused the defendant to fear for the
girlfriend's safety.

The reasoning in Pena should apply with added

force to the case at bar because the instruction was not supported,
as here, by an underlying California statute, but merely by common
law principles.

See Addendum D.

In State v. Knowles, 495 A.2d 335 (Me. 1985), the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine vacated convictions for driving on a revoked
license and driving under the influence of alcohol because the trial
court refused to instruct the jury on a "competing harms" defense.
There, the defendant operated a motor vehicle to escape an assault
upon himself and another person.

The instruction was based on a

Maine statute justifying otherwise criminal conduct where a
defendant "believe[s] it to be necessary to avoid imminent physical
harm to himself or another."

Id_. at 338.

This defense is

equivalent to defendant's defense of justification, and the
reasoning in Knowles should be applied in support of defendant's
instruction.

See Addendum D.
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In State v, Dapo, 470 A.2d 1173 (Vt. 1983), the Vermont
Supreme Court held that the trial court did not err in failing to
instruct the jury on defense of necessity,

in Vermont, the defense

of necessity was already defined in case law.

the Supreme Court

held that a necessary element of the defense - the existence of an
emergency - was not supported by the record on appeal, and the
defendant was therefore not entitled to the instruction.

The court

stated:
. . . a missing child could very well represent an
emergency so imminent and compelling as to raise a
reasonable expectation of harm either to the actor or
to the child. However, under the facts of this case,
at the time of the defendant's criminal activity, the
emergency had already terminated and, as the defendant
knew, his child was safe at home.
Id. at 1175. The reasoning in Dapo should be applied to
support instructing the jury on defense of justification in the
case at bar.

First, defense of necessity is equivalent to

defense of justification, and Dapo recognized the validity of
this defense.

Second, the Vermont Supreme Court recognized

that a missing child could be "an emergency so imminent and
compelling" as to justify instructing the jury on such a
defense.

Third, the result in Dapo must be distinguished on

its facts because in the case at bar the defendant's child was
missing at the time of defendant's arrest.

-19-

See Addendum D.

CONCLUSION
The trial court committed reversible error in refusing to
instruct the jury on defense of justification.
denied due process and a fair trial by jury.

Mr. Gonzales was

For these reasons the

Court of Appeals should vacate the verdict and remand this case for
a new trial.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
BY ADMITTING DOCUMENTS AND TESTIMONY WITHOUT
PRIOR NOTICE TO THE DEFENDANT.
The defendant, through counsel, made a written Request for
Discovery and mailed it to the office of the South Valley County
Attorney on August 25, 1988.

See Addendum E.

This Request included

the following:
2.
A list of all the witnesses that the
State/City intends to call for trial in the
above-entitled matter, their addresses,
telephone numbers and criminal records.
6.
Any reports or results of scientific
tests taken during the investigation of this
case.
At some time prior to September 27, 1988, the South Valley County
Attorney's office voluntarily mailed discovery to defense counsel,
including a Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office Initial Report, DUI
Report Form and Witness list.

See Addendum F.

Although the DUI

Report Form indicates that an Intoxilyzer test was given, there were
no Intoxilyzer documents ever made known or available to the
defendant prior to trial.

Nor was it indicated at section XIII of
-20-

the DUI Report Form that such documents existed.

Also, the list of

witnesses that the prosecutor intended to call at trial included
only one name, that of Deputy Fred Baird.
At trial, Judge Jones allowed the prosecutor to introduce
in evidence three Intoxilyzer documents, over defense objections,
that were not known nor made available to the defense prior to
trial.

(T: 51-62).

and Receipt.

These were the Intoxilyzer Checklist, Affidavit

Later during the trial Judge Jones allowed the

prosecutor to introduce testimony, over defense objections, of a
witness whose name was not included on the list of witnesses
supplied to the defense whom the prosecutor intended to call at
trial.

This witness was Deputy Ken Davis.

(T:

92-94).

Pretrial discovery of evidence is integral to legal due
process and effective confrontation.

See U.S. Const, amends. V and

XIV, §1, and Utah Const, art. I, §12. Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure codifies the prosecutor's obligation to comply
with a defendant's written request for discovery.
Utah Code Ann. (1982).

See, §77-35-16,

In the case at bar, the defendant

specifically requested a witness list and any reports of scientific
tests.

Disclosure of these items—if not mandated under subsections

(a)(1) through (a)(4) of Rule 16 — is required under 16(a)(5).
State v. Knight, the Utah Supreme Court interpreted this Rule:
when the prosecution chooses to respond
voluntarily to a request under subsection
(a)(5) without requiring the defense to
obtain a court order, considerations of
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In

fairness require that the prosecution respond to
the request in a manner that will not be
misleading. Therefore, we articulate two
requirements that the prosecution must meet when
it responds voluntarily to a request for
discovery. First, the prosecution either must
produce all of the material requested or must
identify explicitly those portions of the request
with respect to which no responsive material will
be provided. Second, when the prosecution agrees
to produce any of the material requested, it must
continue to disclose such material on an ongoing
basis to the defense. Therefore, if the
prosecution agrees to produce certain specified
material and it later comes into possession of
additional material that falls within that same
specification, it has to produce the
later-acquired material.
734 P.2d 913, 916-917 (Utah 1987)(footnote omitted).

The Court

reasoned that a continuing obligation to disclose is in the interest
of public policy by increasing confidence in informal discovery
procedures and avoiding "game-playing" between the parties.
Further, it is in the interest of judicial economy by reducing the
need for frequent discovery requests by defense counsel and
court-ordered discovery in an already-burdened criminal justice
system.

16.

at 917 ns. 2, 3; See also §77-35-16(b) ("The

prosecution has a continuing duty to make disclosure.").
These standards were not met by the prosecutor in this
case.

The prosecutor admitted during the trial that he did not know

whether the Intoxilyzer documents had ever been provided to the
defense prior to trial.

(T: 52). Good-faith ignorance of the

prosecution is irrelevant in determining whether he has violated his
discovery duties.

Knight, 734 P.2d at 918 n.5.
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The trial court is empowered under 16(g), Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, to obviate any prejudice resulting from the
prosecutor's violation of discovery rules:
(g)
If at any time during the course of
the proceedings it is brought to the
attention of the court that a party has
failed to comply with this rule, the court
may order such party to permit the discovery
or inspection, grant a continuance, or
prohibit the party from introducing evidence
not disclosed, or it may enter such other
order as it deems just under the
circumstances.
At trial, defense counsel asked the court to exclude from evidence
the Intoxilyzer documents and the testimony of Deputy Davis.
51-62; 92-94).

(T:

The trial court denied any relief pursuant to

defense objections.
The trial court abused its discretion in denying any relief
because the prosecutor's failure to provide discovery resulted in
prejudice sufficient to warrant reversal under Rule 30(a), Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure (§77-35-30, Utah Code Ann. (1982)):
77-35-30. Rule 30 - Errors and defects.
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or
variance which does not affect the
substantial rights of a party shall be
disregarded.
Utah courts have interpreted this Rule as meaning that error is
reversible only if absent the error there was a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant at trial.
Knight, 734 P.2d at 919.

In the case at bar, the testimony of Deputy Davis
constitutes reversible error because he was qualified as an "expert"
by the State and testified that he had no doubt that Mr. Gonzales
"was intoxicated beyond the legal point."

(T:

95-96; 98; 101).

Not having been informed that Deputy Davis would testify, defense
counsel could not prepare to rebut that testimony with other
eye-witness testimony, like that of Mrs. Gonzales.
Admission of the Intoxilyzer documents constitutes
reversible error because absent those documents the State could not
have established a presumption of validity of the Intoxilyzer test
result.

See Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1320 (Utah 1983).

The State did not call a scientific expert to testify as to the
validity of Intoxilyzer technology, nor was a public officer called
to testify as to the accuracy of the Intoxilyzer equipment.

Deputy

Baird testified that he could not explain how the Intoxilyzer
functions.

(T: 70). Further, had it been known that the

Intoxilyzer documents would be offered into evidence at trial,
defense counsel could have prepared to rebut the presumption of
validity through the expert testimony of Dr. Brian Finkle who has
contracted with the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association to testify
at DUI trials.

Under either scenario there is a reasonable

likelihood of a more favorable result for the the defendant at trial.
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CONCLUSION
By admitting evidence not provided to the defendant in
pretrial discovery, the trial court abused its discretion and denied
Mr. Gonzales his constitutional rights of due process and
confrontation.

For these reasons, the Court of Appeals should

reverse the conviction and remand this case for a new trial.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ILLEGALLY SENTENCED THE
DEFENDANT BY ENHANCING THE SENTENCE IMPOSED
IN THE JUSTICE COURT.
On April 25, 1989, Mr. Gonzales entered a conditional plea
of "no contest" in the Second Precinct Justice Court.
G.

See Addendum

He was sentenced then and there as follows:
Sentencing as follows: DUI - $480.00 + $120
Surcharge + $100.00 VR + $50.00 AR fee + 60
days in jail/57 suspended on (1) Payment of
fines & fees-to be determined after stay
date; (2) DUI series to be determined
after stay date; (3) Probation to court 6
months-other 3 days are suspended on 24
hours community service.

Mr. Gonzales paid a $50 attorney referral fee on September 30,
1988.

See Addendum G.
On July 14, 1989, Judge Jones resentenced Mr. Gonzales

following trial as follows:

60 days jail, with three days suspended

on 24 hours community service, and 57 suspended on (1) $480.00 fine
to be paid within 60 days; (2) $120.00 surcharge to be paid within
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60 days; (3) $100.00 Victim Restitution Fund assessment to be paid
within 60 days; (4) $50.00 Alcohol Rehabilitation fee to be paid
within 60 days; and (6) Six months probation supervised by the
Alcohol Counseling and Education Center.

(T: 164-165).

The sentence imposed by Judge Jones differed from that
imposed in the justice court.

First, Judge Jones imposed a $150.00

attorney fee, where the justice court imposed a $50.00 fee which the
defendant paid on September 30, 1988.

Second, Judge Jones ordered

the defendant to pay all fines, fees and assessments (total $900.00)
within 60 days of sentencing, where the justice court imposed no
such order.

Third, Judge Jones ordered that probation be supervised

by the Alcohol Counseling and Education Center, where the justice
court ordered unsupervised probation.

In these three ways, Judge

Jones sentenced Mr.'Gonzales more severely than the justice court.
Imposition of a harsher sentence on appeal violates the
defendant's constitutional rights to appeal and to legal due process
by discouraging his legal defense.

See wisden v. District Court of

Sevier County, 694 P.2d 605 (Utah 1984)(interpreting §76-3-405 Utah
Code Ann. (1978)); see also U.S. Const, amends. V and XIV, §1, and
Utah Const, art. I, §12.

CONCLUSION
Judge Jones illegally sentenced Mr. Gonzales by enhancing
the sentence imposed in the justice court.

For this reason the

Court of Appeal should remand this case to the circuit court for
resentencing with orders (1) that the $150.00 Legal Defender fee be
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vacated; (2) that Mr. Gonzales not be required to pay fines, fees
and assessments within 60 days, but rather as he is able to pay (see
§78-32-1, Utah Code Ann. (1987)); and see Van Hake v. Thomas, 759
p.2d 1162 (Utah 1988)(In order to prove contempt for failure to
comply with a court order it must be shown that the person cited for
contempt knew what was required, had the ability to comply, and
intentionally failed or refused to do so), and (3) that supervision
by the Alcohol Counseling and Education Center not be required as a
condition of probation.

CONCLUSION
The trial court committed reversible error by refusing to
instruct the jury on defense of justification, and by admitting
documents and testimony into evidence that had not been provided to
the defendant in pretrial discovery.

As a result, Mr. Gonzales was

denied a fair trial by jury, and the Court of Appeals should vacate
the verdict and remand this case for a new trial.
Further, the trial court illegally sentenced Mr. Gonzales
by enhancing the sentenced previously imposed in the justice court.
For this reason, the Court of Appeals should remand this case to the
circuit court for resentencing pursuant to its orders.

Respectfully submitted this

^} £"~ day of January, 1990.

ROGER K. SCOWCKflFT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MeryT. Uoormn
CUK of T* Court
liton Court # Appecfe

00O00

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.

CERTIFICATE OF PROBABLE CAUSE
Case No. 890202-CA

Gilberto Gonzales,
Defendant and Appellant.

Before Judges Orme, Garff, and Davidson (On Law and Motion).
Upon defendant's application for a certificate of probable
cause and consideration of the oral arguments and memoranda of
the parties, we consider the issue challenging the sentence
imposed by the circuit court to be fairly debatable and
integral to defendant's conviction.

Therefore, defendant's application is granted and a
certificate of probable cause is hereby issued.

is
DATED this
FOR THE COURT

Grofgory YC. j0rmeT^Judge

day of November, 1989.

ADDENDUM B

INSTRUCTION NO.

DEFENSE OF JUSTIFICATION

Conduct which is justified is a defense to prosecution for
any offense based on the conduct.
Conduct which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a
harm or evil to himself or to another is justifiable, provided that
the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater
than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense
charged.
Therefore, if the defendant proves to your satisfaction
that the above elements of justification did exist, and the
prosecution does not negate the defense of justification beyond a
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to return a verdict of not
guilty.

ADDENDUM C

Ixv /

Model Penal Code

SECTION 3.02.

$3.04.

JUSTIFICATION GENERALLY: CHOICE OF EVILS

(1) Conduct which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself
or to another is justifiable, provided that:
(a) the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that
sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged; and
(b) neither the Code nor other law defining the offense provides exceptions or
defenses dealing with the specific situation involved; and
(c) a legislative purpose to exclude die justification claimed does not otherwise plainly
appear.
(2) When the actor was reckless or negligent in bringing about the situation requiring
a choice of harms or evils or in appraising the necessity for his conduct, the justification
afforded by this Section is unavailable in a prosecution for any offense for which recklessness or negligence, as the case may be, suffices to establish culpability.

COMMENTS TO 5 3 . 0 2 AT 5-9 [(TENT. DRAFT NO. 8, 1958)]

1. This Section accepts the view that a principle of necessity, properly conceived,
affords a general justification for conduct that otherwise would constitute an
offense; and that such a qualification, like the requirements of culpability, is
essential to the rationality and justice of all penal prohibitions.
The principle is subject to three vital limitations:
(a) The necessity must be avoidance of an evil greater than the evil sought
to be avoided by the law defining the offense charged. The balancing of evils
cannot, of course, be committed merely to the private judgment of the actor,
it is an issue for determination in the trial. What is involved may be described
as an interpretation of the law of the offense, in light of the submission that
the special situation calls for an exception to the prohibition that the legislature
could not reasonably have intended to exclude, given the competing values to
be weighed.
(b) The issue of competing values must not have been foreclosed by a deliberate legislative choice, as when the law has dealt explicitly with the specific situation that presents the choice of evils or a legislative purpose to exclude the
justification claimed otherwise appears . . .
(c) When the actor has made a proper choice of values, his belief in the
necessity of his conduct to serve the higher value exculpates — unless the crime
involved can be committed recklessly or negligently. But when the latter is the
case, recklessness or negligence in bringing about this situation requiring the
choice of evils or in appraising the necessity for his conduct may be the basis
of conviction. . . .

ADDENDUM D

STATE v. OLSON

Or. 55

a t e M 719 F^d 55 (OrJtpp. 1986)

Before that he had worked on the green
chain for another employer for six years.
In January, 1983, he started feeling pain in
his shoulders. By June, 1983, he was unable to continue working. In January,
1984, he filed a claim for compensation.
He alleged that "[s]ixteen years on green
chain either caused or accelerated the bilateral rotator cuff tendonitis." SAIF denied
the claim.
Dr. Baker, claimant's treating orthopedic
physician, diagnosed his problem as bilateral rotator cuff tendonitis with partially
frozen shoulders "due to wear and tear
over the past 60 years." He could not say
with reasonable medical probability that
claimant's problem was specifically caused
by his work. He said that it was the result
of wear and tear that must be attributed,
at least in part, to claimant's work activity
over the years and that he would not have
reached his present level of disability had
he not been working on the green chain or
some equivalent activity.
Dr. Degge, an orthopedic physician, examined claimant at SAIF's request. He
stated that, although the underlying condition may have been pre-existing and nonwork related, his present problem "apparently developed * * * as a result of repetitive use of the arms while working on the
green chain over a prolonged period." He
concluded that "[w]hile the condition of
[claimant's] neck and shoulders might have
occurred as a natural progression of his
chronic [pre-existing] condition, there is little doubt that the repetitive use of his arms
in pulling, lifting, pushing, etc., accelerated
this process and would, therefore, constitute an aggravation of a pre-existing condition." (Emphasis supplied.)
In order to prevail, claimant had to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that his
work activity and conditions caused a worsening of his underlying disease resulting
in an increase in pain to the extent that it
produced disability or required medical services. Weller v. Union Carbide, 288 Or.
27, 35, 602 P.2d 259 (1979).
We understand both doctors to have concluded that claimant's work on the green

chain caused a worsening of his pre-existing condition. That worsening caused increased pain, which required him to seek
medical services. Both doctors agree that
he would not have reached his present level
of disability without the effects of his employment See Kepford v. Weyerhaeuser
Co., 77 Or.App 363, 366-67, 713 P.2d 625,
rev. den. 300 Or. 722, 717 P.2d 630 (1986).
We conclude that his condition is compensable. Weller v. Union Carbide, supra.
Reversed and remanded with instructions
to accept claim.

79 Or.App. 302

STATE of Oregon, Respondent,
v.
Eric Leroy OLSON, Appellant
M486112; CA A37579.
Court of Appeals of Oregon.
Argued and Submitted Feb. 10, 1986.
Decided May 14, 1986.

Defendant was convicted in the District Court, Multnomah County, Kimberly
Frankel, J., of driving while under influence of intoxicants. The Court of Appeals,
Young, J., held that defendant's evidence
was sufficient to support choice of evils
defense.
Conviction vacated and remanded.

1. Criminal Law <$=>38
Showing that defendant's driving of
car was necessary to avoid injury or threat
of injury to human or animal life was not
an element of choice of evils defense to
charge of driving while under influence of
intoxicants, which is available if conduct is
necessary as an emergency measure to

56 Or.
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avoid imminent public or private injury.
ORS 161.200(lXa).
2. Criminal Law S=>38
Nothing in choice of evils defense to
driving while under influence of intoxicants
prevents its use when defendant has acted
to protect property rather than life. ORS
161.200(lXa).
3. Criminal Law <8=>569
When defendant's evidence is sufficient to support choice of evils defense to
charge of driving while under influence of
intoxicants, prosecution must rebut it beyond a reasonable doubt. ORS 161.055(1),
161.190.
4. Criminal Law <£=>569
Defendant's testimony that he chose
lesser evil of moving car out of intersection, although he was intoxicated, rather
than leaving it in lane of traffic, sufficiently supported choice of evils defense to require prosecution to rebut evidence.

Garrett A. Richardson, Portland, argued
the cause and filed brief for appellant

with a woman in a restaurant parking lot
Brunt intervened and determined that defendant was intoxicated but that the woman was not At Brunt's suggestion, defendant and the woman left in defendant's
car, with her driving. A few minutes later
Brunt saw the car stop in an intersection.
The woman got out from the driver's side
and walked away. After a moment, defendant moved to the driver's side and
drove the car a short distance. Brunt then
arrested him for DUII.
Defendant admitted that he was intoxicated and that he drove. His defense was
that he chose the lesser evil of moving the
car out of the intersection rather than leaving it in a lane of traffic. The defense is
statutory. ORS 161.200. His motion for a
judgment of acquittal on the ground that
there was insufficient evidence to rebut the
defense was denied. The trial court found
defendant guilty, explaining that there was
not sufficient evidence to support the
choice of evils defense. Although that explanation is not entirely clear, it appears
that the court rejected the defense as a
matter of law.

Officer Brunt saw defendant on the evening of November 23, 1984, in an argument

[1,2] In ruling on the motion and in
announcing its verdict, the trial court apparently held that, in order to establish the
defense, defendant had to show that his
driving the car was necessary to avoid "injury or threat of injury to human or animal
life." That is incorrect That standard is
only applicable to the affirmative defense
provided by former ORS 487.560(2Xa)! to a
charge of driving while suspended or revoked. It is not an element of the choice of
evils defense under ORS 161.200, which is
available if the conduct "is necessary as an
emergency measure to avoid an imminent
public or private injury." ORS 161.200(lXa). The threatened injury must be
"of such gravity that, according to ordinary standards of intelligence and morality, the desirability and urgency of avoid-

1. Farmer ORS 487.560(2Xa) was repealed by
Or.Laws 1983, ch. 338, § 978, as amended by
Or.Laws 1985, ch. 672, § 6, and replaced by

Or.Laws 1983. ch. 338. § 599. as amended by
Or.Laws i985. ch. 16, § 305; ch. 6731. § 18; ch.
744, § 1 (now ORS 811.180(lXa)).

Kendall Barnes, Asst Atty. Gen., Salem,
argued the cause for respondent With
him on brief were Dave Frohnmayer, Atty.
Gen., and James E. Mountain, Jr., Salem.
Before JOSEPH, CJ., and VAN HOOMISSEN and YOUNG, JJ.
YOUNG, Judge.
Defendant was tried by the court and
convicted of driving while under the influence of intoxicants (DUII). He appeals and
claims that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard in evaluating his choice
of evils defense. We vacate the conviction
and remand.

McLEOD v. FOSSI

Or. 57

CIteM719P.2d57 (OrJlpp. 1986)

ing the injury clearly outweigh the desirability of avoiding the injury sought to
be prevented by the statute defining the
offense in issue." ORS 161.200(l)(b).
There is nothing inherent in the choice of
evils defense which prevents its use when
the defendant has acted to protect property
rather than life. See State v. Haley, 64
Or.App. 209, 215, 667 P.2d 560 (1983).
[3] Although an incorrect standard was
applied, the trial court did not err in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal.
Defendant's evidence supported the choice
of evils defense, but it did not establish the
defense as a matter of law. The court was
correct in leaving that decision for the factfinding process. However, the fact-finding
process appears to have gone awry. Not
only did the trial court impermissibly require proof of a threat to life, its comments
indicate that it may have incorrectly placed
the burden on defendant to prove the defense by a preponderance of the evidence,
rather than requiring the prosecution to
rebut it beyond a reasonable doubt. See
ORS 161.055(1); ORS 161.190.
[4] Defendant's evidence was sufficient
to support the choice of evils defense and
to require the prosecution to rebut it.
Whether the prosecution did that is for the
trial court's determination as the fact-finder. Because the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard, its determination
cannot stand. Nevertheless, a new trial is
not warranted. The evidence has been
presented, and the trial court need only
evaluate that evidence under the correct
standard. Accordingly, we vacate the conviction and remand to the trial court On
remand, if the court finds, on the present
record, that the state has disproved the
choice of evils defense beyond a reasonable
doubt, it shall enter a new judgment of
conviction; otherwise, defendant is entitled
to an acquittal.
Conviction vacated; remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.

79 Or.App. 306
John McLEOD, Respondent,
v.
Carl FOSSI, Appellant
43-302; CA A34610.
Court of Appeals of Oregon.
Argued and Submitted Nov. 1, 1985.
Decided May 14, 1986.
Review Denied July 29,1986.
Action was brought seeking to enforce
two promissory notes and claiming attorney fees under provision of the notes. The
Circuit Court, Washington County, Alan C.
Bonebrake, J., entered judgment finding
that one note did not exist and defendant
was not liable on the other, bat denied
defendant attorney fees, and defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, Rossman,
J., held that attorney fees were available
under statute making attorney fee provisions reciprocal.
Reversed and remanded.

1. Costs <s=>173(l)
Under statute making attorney fee
provisions reciprocal, if one party would be
entitled to attorney fees under contract had
it prevailed, other party is similarly entitled
to award when it prevails. ORS 20.096(1).
2. Bills and Notes <3=>534
Party which successfully established
nonliability under promissory notes in action in which party seeking to collect had
prayed for attorney fees under contractual
provision was entitled to attorney fees under statute making such attorney fee provisions reciprocal. ORS 20.096(1).

Charles S. Tauman, Portland, argued the
cause for appellant With him on briefs
was Bennett, Hartman, Tauman & Reynolds, P.C., Portland.
William E. Hurley, Portland, argued the
cause and filed brief for respondent
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PEOPLE ?. PENA
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this amended section as evidence of intended retroactivity. But Statutes 1982, chapter 1535, section 17, specifically states that
"p]f the [repeal of the inheritance tax is]
declared invalid by an appellate court of
this state as applied to estates of persons
dying before the effective date of this act,
to transfers occurring by reason of a death
occurring before the date, or to gifts made
or completed before that date, it is the
intent of the Legislature that the provi
sions shall be applicable only to estates
of persons dying on or after the effective
date of this act "

influence of intoxicating liquor, and he appealed. The Superior Court, Appellate Department, Los Angeles County, Bernstein,
J., held that (1) defense of duress is available, presuming requisites of defense are
satisfied, where defendant is charged with
driving under the influence; (2) defense of
duress may properly be predicated upon
threats of harm to persons other than accused; and (3) refusal to instruct jury regarding availability of defense of duress
was error

[5] Appellant has overlookedfyerecent
use oi Estate of Gibson {\m) p &\
ADP 3d 733,189 Cal Rptr 201, m which the
retroactive effect of Proposition 5 was e\
phcitly rejected on the basis it was m irrec
oncilable conflict with Proposition 6, which
received the higher affirmative vote We
jconcur with the reasoning set out in Gib
son, and hold that the 1982 initiatives and
legislation do not affect the estate of Povd
Martin

1. Criminal Law 038
Homicide £>126
Duress defense is available to defend
ant charged with any crime except one
which involves taking life of an innocent
person.

The judgment is affirmed
LOW, PJ, and KING, J, concur

149CalApp3dSupp 14

jThe PEOPLE, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
T.

Russell David PENA, Defendant
and Appellant
Cnm. A. No. 20250.
Appellate Department, Superior Court,
Los Angeles County

Reversed.

2. Criminal Law <S=>38
Defense of duress is available, presum
ing requisites of such defense are satisfied,
where defendant is charged with driving
under the influence of intoxicating liquor
West'stonCal Vehicle Code 5 23152(a)
3. Criminal Law e=>38
Statute enumerating classes of per
sons who are incapable of committing acts
which constitute crimes does not restrict
application of duress tvpe defences to cases
in which defendant's person is object of
coercive threats of bodily harm West's
Ann CaLPenal Code § 26
4. Criminal Law e=38
Defense of duress may properly be
predicated u p threats of harm to persons
other than accused.
5. Criminal Law ^739(1)
Determinations as to whether prerequisites to establishment of defense of justi
fication/duress have been satisfied are for
tner of fact

6. Automobiles $=352
Defendant would be entitled to acquittal of charge of driving under the influ
Defendant w& convicted before tfte ence, notwithstanding fact of his operation
Municipal Court, Los Angeles County, Al- of motor vehicle while legally intoxicated,
Sept 16» 19S3

ine belief that girl friend, who was ordered
to enter deput/s vehicle, was in danger of
assault by or through deputy, that defendant's good-faith belief was objectively reasonable under totality of circumstances,
that defendant operated his vehicle in obedience to his fear for girl fnend's safety
and not for any other purpose, that defendant had no opportunity to engage alternative legal means of protecting girl fnend
from danger he believed she faced, and
that defendant was not substantially at
fault m creation of emergency situation
which he claimed justified his action in
dnving while intoxicated West's Ann Cal
Vehicle Code 5 23152(a)

its duty to fashion legally adequate instruc
tion in response to defendant's request
10. Automobiles ^357
Cnminal Uw

^nm®
In view of fact that duress was defendant's only defense to charge of dnving
under the influence, refusal to instruct jury
regarding availability of defense was preju&®& error
Richard L Dewberry, White, for defendant and appellant
R obert H Mbsm, Dlst Attj( Don
aid J Kaplan and Sterling S Suga, Deputy
Dist Attys, for plaintiff and respondent.

7 Cnminal Law ^38
JERNSTEIN, Judge
±7
Requirement of defense of duress that
^ ^
^
defendant's for be objectively reasonable ^ ^ ^ fa ^ rf ^
m
one does not rquire that defendant be m ^ ^ ^ m ^ ^ (a),
fact correct in his assessment of situation ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ rf ^ ^
rather, defendant may reh on what ne ^
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ m[
reasonably believes to be true
erred in refusing his proffered jury instruc
8 Automobiles ^356
Whether defendant had reasonable belief that gin fnend who w& ordered to
enter deputy's vehicle, was m danger from
deputy, for purpose of establishing defense
of duress m prosecution for defendant's
dnving under the influence n following
deputy s vehicle, was question of fact

tion, regarding appellants theon of m>
defense That theory was predicated on
the presumed a\ailabilitv of what is p e r
allj termed the defense of duress : Whold that the defense was indeed available
to appellant, and that the evidence adduced
at trial mandated a jun irstruction on th j
subject Accordmgk *e reverse the judg
mentot conuction

9. Criminal Law e=830
FACTS
Defendants omission from requested On November 5, 1981, appellant was
duress instruction of requirement that de- charged by complaint with violations of
fendant's fears for girl fnend be objective- former Vehicle Code sections 23102, subdily reasonable did not relieve trial court of vision (a)3 (count I) and 12500, subdivision
L Vehicle Code section 23102, subdivision (a)
was renumbered section 23152, subdivision (a)
m 1981 (Stats.1981 ch 940 » 12.33)
1 In this opinion, "duress" is used interchange
abl\ with terns bich h .oenon" \ompui
sion," "necessity" or "justification" Although
there arc some distinctions, they are not maten
al for purposes of this opinion. For a discussion of these distinction* see Conde, \eassu\
Defined: A new Rob m the Criminal Defense
System (1981) 29 UCLA LRcv. 409,427432,

Frank D. Berry, Jr. The Mysterious Defense cf
Necessity (1979) 54 State Bar J. 384.
3 \ ehicle Code secaon 23102, >ubdi\ ision (a) as
it read on November * 1981 provided as fo
low*.
"(a) It is unlawful for any person who is
under the influence of intoxication liquor or
under trie comoined influcrce of indication
liquor and any drug, to drive a vehicle upon any
highway."
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(a)< (failure to have driver's license, count Appellant's second jury trial commenced
U II) and'Healthjand Safety Code section on October 5,1982. The difficulties experi11357, subdivision (b)5 (possession of less ence(i k & ^ W a» r e f l e c ted in
than one ounce of marijuana, count III). *• ™ * W aurt ***'
Counts II and III were subsequently dis- On October 29,1982, the court sentenced
missed on motion of the People pursuant to appellant to one year in the county jail.7
Penal Code section 1385. Appellant was jjbe evidence presented at appellant's tri- j ,
tried by jury on count I; a mistrial was al was essentially undisputed. Los Angedeclared on May 25,1982;ivhen the jury les County Sheriffs Deputy Frank Webb
reported itself to be hopelessly deadlocked, testified that he first encountered appellant
The engrossed settled statement on appeal at approximately 4 a.m. on November l,
states that "[d]uring deliberations (follow- 1S8L Webb, on patrol in Pico Rivera, obing appellant's first trial), the jurors re- served appellant and Sara Marrufo, appelquested instruction on the issue of the de- lant's girlfriend, asleep in a parked car.8
fense of justification, ..." and were in- Webb stated that "due to the late hour," he
structed by the court that it was not avail- decided to investigate the situation. He
able as a defense to the charge
exited his patrol vehicle and approached
4. Section 12500, subdivision (a) provides:
"(a) No person shall drive a motor vehicle
upon a highway unless he then holds a driver's
license issued under this code, except such persons as are expressly exempted under this
code."

39 p.m. jury retires to deliberate further.
Jury returns to courtroom at 4:50 p.m.,
*Wc the jury in the above-entitled cause find
the defendant guilty of the offense charged to
wit 23102(a) V.C signed Foreman.'"

7. Although appellant does not challenge the validity of his sentence, we are constrained to
"(b) Except as authorized by law, every per- point out, for guidance of the parties in (he
son who possesses not more than one avoirdu- event of a retrial, that the sentence is of dubious
pois ounce of marijuana, other than concentrat- validity.
ed cannabis, is guilty of a misdemeanor and
The trial court pronounced sentence in apparshall be punished by a fine of not more than
ent
reliance upon appellant's "admission" of
one hundred dollars ($100):
three prior convictions for violations of (forI "COURT INSTRUCTS JURY: THEY WERE
mer) Vehicle Code section 23102, subdivision
SWORN:
(a). However, the complaint in me instant case
Jury retires to deliberate at 3.D5 p.m. Jury(M 147948, Whittier MUILCL) establishes that
returns to courtroom at 4:15 p.m. for rereadeach of the prior offenses alleged occurred
ing of the jury instructions.
4:17 p.m. jury retires to deliberate further. more than five years before the date of the
Jury returns to courtroom at 4:38 p.m. for "offense" in the instant matter. Specifically the
complaint alleges as follows:
rereading of jury instruction!
5. Section ll 357, subdivision (b) provides:

Case No.
M 92945
M106902
M116056

Municipal Court
0 Monte""
Whittier
Whittier

Date of Offense
9-18-74
2-7-75
Feb, 1976

Date of Conviction
2-7-75
1-27-76
2-22-77

In the instant case, the operative statutes speresulted in a conviction of an offense under
cifying permissible punishment for driving unthis section or section 23105 shall be punished
der the influence are former Vehicle Code secby imprisonment in the county jail for no!
tion 23102, subdivisions (c) and (d). These sub*
less than 48 hours nor more than one year
paragraphs provided in pertinent part:
and by a fine of not less than three hundred
"(c) Any person convicted under this section
fifty-five dollars ($355) nor more than one
shall be punished upon a first conviction by
thousand dollars ($1,000):
imprisonment in the county jail not less than
Thus, it plainly appears that appellant could
48 hours nor more than six months or bv a
not be sentenced to a jail term longer than the
fine of not less than three hundred fifty-five
six months maximum specified in subparagraph
dollars ($355) nor more than five hundred
(c), above.
dollars ( $ » ) or by both such fine and imprisonment.
1 It was stipulated at trial that the car was
"(d) Any person convicted under this section
parked on private property.
of an offense which occurred within five

the parked car, at which time he stated that Appellant testified that he followed
he smeiled alcohol. Webb then ordered the Webb and San in the sister's car. His
occupants, appellant and Sara, to exit then" reason for doing so was his fear for the
vehicle and demanded to see written idenfj- physical safety of his girlfriend. Appellant
fication. Both parties complied. Follow- had observed Webb's earlier weapons
ing this, Webb undertook a search of the search of Sara; it is at this point the only
"suspects" assertedly to ascertain if either conflict in the evidence develops. Deputy
of them were in possession of "weapons." Webb testified that he drove Sara directly
Sara, at the time she was subjected to home and only after this, while "exiting
Deputy Webb's "weapons search," was Sara Marrufo's doorway," did he observe
dressed in a somewhat unusual manner. "an unusual black shadow" which proved
She was wearing a long fur coat and, ac- to be appellant Appellant was sitting in
cording to the engrossed statement, "was the vehicle earlier described, with the mo
R e c a l l i n t h e alcoho1 odor at
semi-nude thereunder, wearing onlv a very tor ^
?
te
o{ his on nal encounter lth
brief see-through teddy nightgown" (Sara
™*
^
*
a
n t and Sara Webb felt M a !
testified that she and appellant had attend- P ! *
>
^*
ed a Halloween costume party earlier in the lant had driven to his current location while
evening, and that her costume was suppos- under the influence of alcohol. He ordered
ed to be that of a "flasher"). Webb or- appellant out of the vehicle and, according
to Webb, thereupon administered field sodered Sara to open her coat, which she did . . u > 4 ...
„ t M J ,ULL
,m-u„n„ WU»L
-J j , bnetv tests which appellant failed. Webb
very briefly. Webb thereupon ordered her
'
. „ „,
toagainopenhercoatandtokeepitopen. ^ M l d i ^ Subsequently, apDeputv Webb then examined Sara's body *** t0ok a n ' m ^ ' (teth) test
with his flashlight Following this exami- which showed a?Fe!!anfc's biood alcohoi levnation, the deputy turned Sara around and el l0 •* ap P r0Xin,ately Ai
pulled her coat up from the rear and conlin- However, according to Sara, Webb
ued his examination with the flashlight stopped his car "by some railroad teks";
During his interrogation and search of at M ^ Webb observed ^M t0
appellant and Sara Marrufo, Deputv Webb «» following them. Webb stated to Sara
M
ascertained the following:
*
*WM "would be made s o n 7" f o r
1. The vehicle in which aooellant and Mom* ta- Webb then started his
his girlfriend had been sleeping was reg- vehicle up again and drove to Sara's residence.
istered to Sara's sister;
2. Appellant lived "about one block" Appellant testified concerning his arrest
from the location of the events above by Webb as follows: After he was ordered
out of the car in which he had followed
described;
3. Sara lived about three miles from the Webb and Sara, appellant was immediately
location;
arrested and handcuffed by Webb. Appel^M U no Mi **** tests
administered to him by Webb, although he admitted to Webb that he had
Deputy Webb concluded the encounter m m e i mn\ fan at the Halloween
by ordering Sara to enter his vehicle inas- part y ^ y e a r |j 8 r attended with Sara.
much as the deputy had decided to take
J» Sara home. Webb's onlyjasserted reason At both trials, appellant requested that
for this action was that it was for Sara's the following instruction be given to the
"protection."! Webb drove from the scene jury.
"Evidence has been received to the efwith Sara in tow, leaving appellant in possession of Sara's sister's vehicle.
fect that the reason defendant, Russell
4. Sara's identification showed her to be
20 years of age.

9. The record is devoid of any suggestion that
Deputy Webb possessed the legal authority to

M

were

take Sara home, or anywhere else, against her
wishes.
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where A destroyed a dike because B
threatened to kill him if he did not, A
would argue that he acted under duress,
whereas if A destroyed the dike in order
to protect more valuable property from
flooding, A could claim the defense of
necessity. See Generally LaFave and
M 374-384." (444ILS. at p. 409,100
S.Ctatp.634.)
Although California law regarding the
"justification" defenses (Le, "duress," "necessity," "compulsion," etc see, fn. 2,
jit jThe trial court not only refused appelante) appears sparse in comparison to that
lant's tendered instruction, but further inof most American jurisdictions, there nonestructed the jury, upon the panel's inquiry
theless exist several Court of Appeal deciduring its deliberations, that the defense of
sions which provide some guidance as to
"justification" was in fact no defense to the
the parameters of those defenses-most
charge.
recently the court in People v. Patrick
The sole question on appeal is whether (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 952, 179 CaLRptr.
the trial court committed reversible error in 276, noted that:
refimg to inslract the jury, eifor by way
"A/CAoagA trie exact confines of the
of appellant's tendered instruction or a sim- necessity defense remain clouded, a wellilar, court fashioned charge, regarding the established central element involves the
applicability of the defense of duress.
emergency nature of the situation, Le.,
the imminence of the greater harm which
Upon Proper Evidentiary Showing The De- the illegal act seeks to prevent (See
fense of Duress Is Available To Any State i\ Johnson [M)
miintfm
Criminal Charge Other Than A Capital fl83 N:.W.2d .541, .543,45 A.L.R.3d 1432].)
Offense
The commission of a, crime cannot be
The United States Supreme Court has countenanced where tljere exists the posrecently had occasion to discuss the defens- sibility of some alternate means to allevies of duress and necessity in the context of ate the threatened greater harm." (126
a prosecution for escape from lawful con- CaLApp.3d at p. 960,179 CaLRptr. 276.)
finement In United Slates v. Bailey jjn the leading California case regarding Ji 1
(1980), 444 U.S. 394, 100 S.CL 624, 62 the applicability of the duress defense to a
LEd.2d 575, the high court observed as charge of prison escape, People v. Lornfollows:
camp (1974) 43 CaLApp.3d 823, 118 Cal.
"Common law historically distin- Rptr. 110, the court fashioned a five part
guished between the defenses of duress judicialtestfor determining the avaiia&iEy
and necessity. Duress was said to ex- of the defense. In such cases, the Lovercuse criminal conduct" where the actor camp court observed that it was not forwas under an unlawful threat of immi- mulating a new rule of law, but rather was
nent death or serious bodily injur}', which applying "rules long ago established in a
threat cawed the actor :o engage >n con- manner which effects fundamental jusduct violating the literal terms of the tice." (43 Cal.App.3d at p. 827,118 Cal.
criminal law. While the defense of du- Rptr. 110.) h People v. Graham (WW
ress covered the situation where coercion Cal.App.3d 238, 129 CaLRptr. 31 it was
had its soun£ k the actions of other held that the burden of proof in cases in
human befltf&'the defense of necessity, which duress was asserted by a defendant,
or choice of evils, traditionally covered required only that the defendant "raise a
the situation where physical forces be- reasonable doubt that he had acted in the
vond the actor's control rendered illegal exercise of his free will." (57 Cai.App.3d
Pena, drove the car was because he believed that Sara Marmfo was in physical
danger."
"You are hereby instructed that if you
find that it has been established by a
preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant had a good faith belief that
Sara Marrufo might be in physical danger, and drove the car for Tier protection
or to render possible aid, then you may
acquit him based on this defense."

Two issues of apparent first impression
in this jurisdiction must be addressed before imposition of theinstinttppezlm be

circumstances, or by the application of
duress on the defendant by another person."M
effectat
j[2] Thus, we hold that the defense of j
(1) Is the duress/necessity defense avail- duress, is available, presuming other requiable to a defendant charged with misde- sites of such a defense are satisfied, where
meanor driving under the influence?
a defendant is charged with the violation of
(2) Is the duress/necessity defense avail Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (a),
able to a defendant who commits an unlawful act in an effort to prevent immi- Tie Duress Defense is Applicable To Sk&nent harm to a third party?
tions In Mich The Threatened Hwn
[1] With respect to thefirstquestion, it
appears settled that the duress defense is
available to a defendant charged with any
crime except one which involves the taking
of the life of an innocent person. (15 Am.
Jur.Crim.Uw § 31A; also see annotation
entitled Coercion, compulsion, or duress as
defense to criminal prosecution, 40 A.L
R.2d 908.) Typical case authority for this
proposition is represented by holdings such
as the following: "It is established by the
great weight of authority that although
coercion does not excuse taking the life of
an innocent person, yet it does excuse in all
lesser crimes." {Stale r. Si Clair (Mo.
1953) 262 S.Wid 25,27.) "We hold that
duress is an affirmative defense to a crime
other than murder...." (Stale r. Toscano
(1977) 74 NJ. 421,378 Aid 755,756.) The
logic which compels the availability of such
defenses is described in Fmher r. State
(1970) 8 MdApp. 439,260 A.2d 656,661:
"It is essential to a crime that the
defendant committed a voluntary act
.... The voluntary requirement of the
criminal act relates directly to compulsion; it is a defense as to ail crimes
except taking the life of an innocent person that the defendant acted under a
compelling force of coercion or duress. 1
Wharton's Criminal Law (Anderson) Section 123, P. 261. The compulsion may be
by necessity, that is duress arising from
10. Two caxs, both from Texas, specifically deal
with the applicability of the justification defenses to prosecutions for driving while intoxicated.
These cases, Bush v. State (1981) TexApp., 624
S.Wid 377 and D m v. State (1977) TccCr.
App., 359 S.W Id 307—recognize the apphcabiiity of such defenses to the charge of driving
under the influence (although both cases held

Is To Pems 0ther to n Mml

*

'

2/3i

[t appears that no California case has
directly addressed the question of whether
the duress defense is available in situations
wherein the C0€rcive circumstances ari,;e
from threatened harm not to ^ defendait
personally, but to some party other than
the accused. The classic example is that of
a bank teller whose child has been kidnaped. The kidnapers order the teller to
use his position of trust at the bank to
embezzle money for the kidnapers. The
teller is informed that his child will be
killed if he does not comply with the cemands. The teller himself is not threatened with bodily harm. Would an embezzlement under such circumstances constitute a crime? (See Conde. Necessity De]M; A A>Ir M m h Cnmul [)e,
fm Sy$lm {m 3 lCLA LRev ^
438-439.)
It appears that virtually every jurisdiction in which the issue has been settled
permits threats to third parties to sa&fy
the requisite coercive circumstance requirement so as to bring the duress defense into
play. Perhaps the best articulation of the
rationale for permitting threats to persons
other than the defendant to allow invocauon of these defenses, appears in a Massacnusetts :ase. Commonmlth i\ Uarlin
that the necessary elements of the proffered
defenses were not factually established), (flee,
also, Browning v. Slate (1943) 31 AiiApp. 137,
13 Soid 54 [defense of compulsion held to
'excuse crime of reckless driving]; State v. Hap
land (196;; 4 Con.iCir 424,233 Aid o9S [illegal parking).)
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(1976) 369 Mass. 640,341 N.E.2d 885,891- [3] In the case at bench, the People
892:
contend that Penal Code section 26" re"Whatever the precise precedents, it is stricts the application of duress type dehardly conceivable that the law of the fenses to cases in which the defendant's
commonwealth, or, indeed, of any juris- person is the object of coercive threats of
diction [fn. omitted], should mark as bodily harm. The People's argument cancriminal those who intervene forcibly to not withstand scrutiny. To begin, nothing
protect others; for the law to do so in the language of section 26 can be conwould aggravate the fears .which lead to strued as limiting the applicability of the
the alienation of people from one anoth- duress-necessity defenses to the circumer, an alienation symbolized for our time stances therein described. The section
by the notorious Genovese incident merely enumerates the classes of persons
[Footnote omitted.] To the fear of "in- who, under the circumstances contemplated
volvement" and of injury to oneself if by the statute, are incapable of commitone answered a call for help would be ting acts which constitute crimes. Nothadded the fear of possible criminal prose- ing in the statute can be read to require the
conclusion that a person not so enumeratcution. [Fn. omitted.]"
ed, Li, a person who is capable of commitThe Martin court observed that some
ting.^ crime, has in fact committed one by
European countries have passed laws makhtf action in a given case. Indeed, other
ing it a criminal offense not to render aid
sections of the Penal Code explicitly authoin certain circumstances:
rize, under certain circumstances, the com"It is instructive that the laws of some
mission of acts which ordinarily would conj u countries in Continental Europe jdestitute crimes. In particular, we refer to
nounce as a crime the failure to render
Penal Code sections 692-694:
help in given circumstances. See J.P.
"Lawful resistance to the commission of
Dawson, Negotiorum Gestio; The Ala public offense may be made: ^
truistic Intermeddler, U Harvard Law
"1. By the party about to be injured;
Review 817, 1073, 1101-1114 (1961).
"2. By other parties." (Pen.Code,
Thus art 330c of the West German Crim§692.)
inal Code, as amended in 1953, provides
(translation by Professor Dawson): ^Resistance sufficient to prevent the of'Whoever does not render help in cases fense may be made by the party about to
of accident, common danger or necessity be injured:
although help is required and under the "1. To prevent an offense against his
circumstances is exactable, and in partic- person, or his family or some member
ular is possible without danger of serious thereof.
injury to himself and without violation of "2. To prevent an illegal attempt by
other important [Wichtige] duties, will be force to take or injure property in his
punished by imprisonment up to one year lawful possession." (PenCode, § 693.)
or by fine.' l i , at 11044105." (341 "Any other person in aid or defense of
N.E.2datp.891,fn.l2.)
the person about to be injured, may
11. Penal Code section 26 provides:
"All persons are capable of committing crimes
except those belonging to the following classes:
"One—Children under the age of 14, in the
absence of clear proof that at the time of committing the act charged against them, they knew
its wrongfulness.
Tw^-Idiots.
"Three—Pcrsons-^ho committed the act or
made the omission charged under an ignorance
or mistake of fact, which disproves any criminal
intent.

Tour-Persons who committed the act
charged without being conscious thereof.
"Five-Persons who committed the act or
made the omission charged through misfortune
or by accident, when it appears that there was
no evil design, intention, or culpable negligence.
"Sii—Persons (unless the crime be punishable
withideath) whojammitted theact or made the
omission charged under threats or menaces sufficient to show that they had reasonable cause
to and did believe their lives would be endangered if they refused."

make resistance sufficient to prevent the We recognize that, under the requireoffense." (Pen.Code, § 694.)
ments listed above there is no suggestion
Case law construing the above quoted
sections of the Penal W e uniformly holds
that it is not necessary that the threatened
harm be actual, only that it reasonably
appear so: "Justification does not depend
on the existence of actual danger but on
appearances. [Citations.]" (Peopfe ti Col
Iks (1961) 189 CaLApp.2d 515,588,11 Cal
Rptr. 504. See, also, People v. McKee
(1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 53,61,71 CaLRptr.
26; People v. hckson (1965) 233 Cal.
App.2d 639,641413,43 CaLRptr. 81T.)
[41 We hold that a defense of duress
may properly be predicated upon threats of
harm to persons other than the accused,
Elements of the Duress Defense
The following requirements have traditionally been held to be prerequisites to the
establishment of the defense of justifies
tion/duress:
1. The act charged as criminal must
have been done to prevent a significant
2. There most have been no adequate
alternative to the commission of the act;13

t
^ fte to* s o u ? k to
•* mM be ^
of death or great bodfly injury. Penal
Code section 26, subdivision six provides
that persons who commit acts (other than
capital offenses) otherwise constituting
crimes, while in reasonable fear for their
lives should they refuse to commit the act,
cannot be held criminally liable. As we
stated earlier, Penal Code section 26, subdivision six is not coextensive with the parameters of the duress defense. Indeed it
is clear that this subdivision merely addresses itself to one particular eircumstance within the general requirement that
the charged act must not cause harm disproportionate to the harm avoided. Under
the circumstances contemplated by section
26, subdivision six, the harm sought to be
avoided is the loss of life of the actor,
Since no act undertaken by the threatened
party in such circumstances (other than the
commission of a capital offense) would
cause a harm disproportionate to the harm
to be avoided, it is clear that the subdivision is merely descriptive of one set of
possible circumstances falling within the
ambit of the duress defense. However, as
^ fc defense o{ duress
we have ^

3. The harm caused by the act must not is not limited to situations wherein the acbe disproportionate to the harm avoided;12 cused acted in reasonable fear of his life.
^ Penal ^ M§§ 692,693,694 see infra) explicitly permit the commission of acts otherwise criminal, under circumstances where the actor
need not be in fear of his life to be able to
avail himself of the duress defense. Under
the "disproportionate harms" requirement,
it is plain that as the harm sought to be
avoided decreases in seriousness the duress
[5] These determinations are for the tri- defense will excuse fewer and fewer acts
er of fact
undertaken to avoid that harm.15

4. The accused must entertain a goodfaith belief that his act was necessary to
prevent the greater harm;u
jo. Such belief must be objectively reasonable under all the circumstances; and
6. The accused must not have substantially contributed to the creation of the
emergency.

11 Sec, eg., Cleveland v. Municipality of Anchora ^ {Alaska 1981) 631 PJd 1073,1078.

0ther sections of

end harm, the defenses will fail" (444 US. at
p. 411,100 S.O. at p. 635.)

13. Sec, also, Med Stales v. Bailey, supra (du- 14. People v. Patrick, supra, 126 CaLAppJd at
ress and necessity) "Under any definition of page 962,179 CaLRptr. 276.
these defenses one principle remains constant:
If there was a reasonable, legs! alternative to 15. This is the reason that the justification deviolating the law, 'a chance both to refuse to do
fenses are sometimes referred to as the "choice
the criminal act and also to avoid the threatof evils' defense.
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Lastly, with respecttothe oft-cited "imminence" requirement of the defense, it is
apparent that this requirement is included
within ^ more general "no alternative"
requirement Obviously, the more imminent the peril, the less likely the existence
of an alternative course of action. (See,
also, State v. Toscano, supra, 378 Aid at
pp. 762-765.)

sonable one does not require that appellant
be in fact correct in his assessment of the
situation. Rather, as in any situation
where a defendant claims as his defense
that the charged acts were justified as having been undertaken in response to some
emergency circumstance (Le., self-defense),
& defendant may rely on what he reason*My believes to be true. Whether appellant, in the instant case, had a reasonable
Appellant Was Entitled To An Instruction y ^ f that Sara was in danger from DepuOn the Defense of Duress
ty Webb is a question of fact That Webb
[6] We now evaluate the merits of the seemed clearly to be an on-duty police offh
instant appeal in light of the foregoing cer may be a factor to consider in assessing
legal principles. Appellant would be enti- *e reasonableness of defendant's fear, but
tied to an acquittal of thejcharge against il * c e r t a i n 'y n o t the o n l ? s u c h factor11
him, notwithstanding the fact of hi^opera- 0ther considerations which the jury could
tion of a motor vehicle while l e g a l l y W P ^ ' w e i ? h inclu(ie the c r e d i b i l i t )' o f
cated, if he could convince the jury of the De ? ut ? Webb's mM reason for ^
Sah from the scene a a i n s t her a arent
truth of the following:
?
PP
. . .., , wishes, the reasonableness or unreason/1X - . . , ..
(1) frt e held a genuine behef that ^ rf W s ^
mi ^
o{
Sara Marrufo was ,n danger of assault by
and ^ and fc ^
rf
fc
or through Deputy Webb;
,.c . , ,
0
r
*
search oi Sara in particular.
(2) That appellant's good faith belief was
objectively reasonable under the totality of [9,10] We note that in appellant's first
the circumstances;
trial, the jury during its deliberations, re(3) That appellant operated his vehicle in turned to the courtroom and r e W t e d
obedience to his fear for Sara's safety and [m the court instructions on the "defense
o{
not for any other purpose;
'
justification." The court advised the
mm,,
il i L j
-i «fc i F T that the defense of [justification was \n
(4) That appellant had no opportunity to
,,,
. . r - lL .
-1l l a b l e as a defen Se to the charge
engage alternative legal means of protect- * f f
,
'
L
ing Sara from the danger he believed she ? e flrst»' was ^ l0 reach ^
j ^.
diet. At the second trial, we know from
'
the docket, that the jurv experienced con(5) That appellant was not substantially sjderable ^ ^ ^ d;aling ^ ^ iri.
at fault m the creation of the emergency iMim
We a i s o know lhat al ^
situabon which he claims jusffies hb ac- ^ ^ m a
^
t (rom ^
ton in driving while intoxicated.
, .(
......
., ,
6
lant for a specific instruction on the de[7,81 We observe that the requirement fense of duress and that \he instruction
16.
officers,fear
on be
dutyanorobjectively
otherwise, have
that Police
appellant's
rea- was refused" In view of the fact that
been known to commit crimes. Further, recent
events demonstrate the possibility that police
officers may be impersonated. Thus, we cannot
hold that Deputy Webb's status as a law enforcement officer required, as a matter of law, that
appellant be convinced of Webb's benign intention toward Sara.

17* The insttctioh requested by appellant was
defective in at least one particular, i.e., it omitted the requirement that defendant's fears for
San be objectively reasonable. However, that
1

--. ~i.*.,» ,k» tri-jl rnurt of its dutv to

fashion a legally adequate instruction in response to appellant's request
The trial judge was not required to adopt the
language suggebted by a defendant m the
Court's instructions to the jury, however,
when a theory of defense finds some support
in the evidence and in the law, a defendant \$
entitled to some mention of that theory in the
instructions. United States v. Swallow, 511
F 2d 514 (10th Cir.1975). Even when the supporting evidence is weak or of doubtful :K6
bility its presence requires an instruction on
the theory of defense. Tatum v. United
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duress was appellant's only defense, it was
error for the trial court to refuse to instruct the jury regarding the availability of
this defense.

years in which he did not file state income
tax return; and (4) prosecutor was not
required to show that defendant intended
to evade requirements of the statute.

Affirme(L
CONCLUSION
We hold that the defense of justification
was available to the appellant herein and f „ . . .. *~
A t n * • ». l a •
* i L Criminal Law £>20
the faflure to s>o instruct the jury constitut„ . . . , .
,. tt
edprejAalem*. Accordingly,thejadg<** "»of ^
* J *
mentisrerersei
not common-law crunes and classdied JS
"malum prohibitum" rather than malum

FOSTER, PJ., and COOPERMAN, J.,
concur

(0

.

in se

<" are P™ hafale des P ite absence of
criminal intent in any of its accepted
senses.

l

f^y

2. Constitutional Law ^285.2
Taxation $=952
Statute making it a crime not to file
state income tax return does not violaie
149 CaUppJd Supp. 41
due process because it is a strict liability
j « jThe PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent statute which does not require scienter,
since power to tax is certainly with state's
police power and failure to file returns and
Leroy S. JONES, Defendant
^ ^ ^ be ^ ^ of ^ ^
and Appellant
Cr. A. 1123.
Appellate Department. Superior Court.
San Bernardino County.
Sept 26,1983.

Defendant was convicted m the Maniapal Court, San Bernardino County, Dan L
Rankins, J., and Thomas Parry, Temporar>f
Judge, of failing to file state income tax
returns, and he appealed. The Superior
Court, Appellate Department, Ziebarth,
PJ., held that (1) statute making it a
crime to fail to file state income tax returns
does not violate due process because it is a
strict liability statute which does not require scienter (2) evidence was insufficient
to support claim of discriminatory prosecution premised on defendant's membership
in tax protester group; (3) evidence was
sufficient to support jury finding that defendant actually received his earnings in
Slates, 88 U.SippJ).C 384.190 FJd 612
(1951)"

^
West's Ann.CaI.Rev. & T. Caie
§ 19401; U.S.C.A. ConsL\meni 14.
3. Criminal Law ^569
Evidence in prosecution for failing to
file state income tax returns was insufficient to support claim of discriminatory
^m^(m based on defendant'5
shl in
P ^ P rotester W

m

^'

4. Criminal Law $=338(2)
Circumstantial evidence is an accept*
ble form of proof, even in criminal cases.
5. Taxation 6=>1103
Evidence in prosecution for failure to
file state income tax returns, including testimony of fellow employee of defendant
that defendant never complained about not
getting paid, was sufficient to support jun*
finding that defendant actually received his
earnings in years he did not file tax returns.
(i/mraf 5 t o » y. Gamer (dlh OT.1976K 529 F2d
w 970. See. also. Pwle v. Seieno (1974) 10
CalJd 703.716,112 CaLRptr. 1.51S PJd 913.)
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sion to be other than a just one Although
the wife brought more assets to the marriage than did the husband, the husband
was the couple's sole source of income for
the first year of the marriage, and contributed a significant portion of the income
thereafter. In light of these circumstances, the decision to make an equal division
was not an abuse of discretion by the divorce court.1
Whether the division was in fact equal is
another issue. The wife squarely condemns the divorce court's finding that "the
marital property in the possession of the
Plaintiff and Defendant is substantially
equal and therefore each party should keep
that property." The wife further argues
that the divorce court erred in failing to
make specific findings as to the value, identity, and location of items of personal property. Although the unsworn lists of items
and values submitted to the court by the
parties were markedly disparate, the divorce court did not indicate on whose appraisal reliance was placed.
[7,8] In a case such as this it may be
impracticable and nearly impossible for the
divorce court to make a specific finding as
to the value and location of each chattel
with which the court is dealing. Here that
problem is exacerbated by the parties' disagreement as to both values and locations,
their disputes with some of the values assigned by the independent appraiser, and
their failure in many instances to offer
evidence of value apart from their own
respective estimates. While we deplore the
divorce court's failure to state upon which
appraisal or appraisals the court was relying, cf. Shirley v. Shirley, 482 A.2d 845,
849 (Me.1984), nevertheless the court was
certainly entitled to rely upon the evidence
the court found most credible.

pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 52(b), the Plaintiff
could have easily requested further findings, specifically addressing the estimated
values upon which the court was relying.
This she failed to do. Therefore, we cannot now say that the court's omission of
more specific findings as to value constitutes reversible error.
[9,10] Finally, the wife contends that
the Superior Court erred in failing to
award her periodic alimony or a lump sum.
The divorce court is afforded considerable
discretion in its decision as to alimony.
See, e.g., Skelton v. Skelton, 490 A.2d
1204, 1207 (Me.1985); Shirley, 482 A.2d at
847. In the instant case, we find no abuse
of this discretion. The wife left the marriage, which was of relatively short duration, with substantial assets. In addition,
she had the ability to support herself as a
counselor and an antique dealer. The ruling therefore was not inappropriate.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
All concurring.
(q
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Moreover, upon the court's issuance of
its findings of facts and conclusions of law,

Defendant was convicted in the Superior Court, Somerset County, of operating a

1. In Shirley v. Shirley, 482 A.2d 845. 849 (Mc.
1984), we voiced our disapproval of the trial
court's dividing the marital property according
to who currently had possession. However, we
found that because the Plaintiff had failed to

provide estimates of values, we could not determine whether the division was inequitable. In
the instant case, in contrast, both parties supplied estimates, and an independent appraisal of
many, but not all, antiques was performed.

336

Me.

495 ATLANTIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

motor vehicle after his right to operate had
been revoked because he was a habitual
offender and of operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor, and he appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court, Violette, J., held that trial
court improperly denied defendant's request for an instruction on competing
harms to effect that, though he was alleged to have operated his van while intoxicated and under license suspension, such
operation could be justified because he believed it to be necessary to avoid imminent
physical harm to himself or another.
Judgment vacated, and case remanded
for proceedings consistent with opinion.
1. Criminal Law <3=>772(6)
A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on a particular defense when he
can point to the existence of evidence sufficient to make the existence of all the facts
constituting the defense a reasonable hypothesis for the fact finder to entertain
regardless of whether it is the prosecution
or the defendant or both who produce the
evidence. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 103, subd. 1.
2. Criminal Law e=>43.5
Inconsistent defenses may generally
be interposed in a criminal case such as
when a defendant pleads both not guilty
and not guilty by reason of insanity to the
same charge.
3. Criminal Law <s=>56(ll)
Reliance upon a particular defense by
the defendant should not automatically relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove
all the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt
4. Criminal Law <fc*330
The denial of the criminal act by the
defendant should not relieve the prosecution of its burden to negate any defense
generated by the evidence.
5. Criminal Law <*=>43.5It was not inconsistent for the defendant to deny that he had operated his van

while intoxicated and under license suspension and at same time assert that his operation of the van could be justified under the
doctrine of competing harms because he
believed it to be necessary to avoid imminent physical harm to himself or another.
17-A M.R.S.A. § 103, subd. 1; 29 M.R.S.A.
§§ 1312-B, 2298; Rules Crim.Proc., Rule
11(a).
6. Criminal Law e=*720(6)
The prosecution is free to point out an
inconsistency in the assertion of defenses
by the defendant during the trial and at the
time of argument.
7. Criminal Law <s=>43.5
A defendant should have the option of
presenting inconsistent defenses to the fact
finder as long as there is evidence, from
whatever source, that could rationally support those defenses.
8. Criminal Law <s=>772(6)
Trial court improperly denied defendant's request for an instruction on competing harms to effect that, though he was
alleged to have operated his van while intoxicated and under license suspension,
such operation could be justified because
he believed it to be necessary to avoid
imminent physical harm to himself or another. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 103, subd. 1; 29
M.R.S.A. §§ 1312-B, 2298; Rules Crim.
Proc., Rule 11(a).
John Alsop (orally), Asst Dist Atty.,
Skowhegan, for plaintiff.
Vafiades, Brountas & Kominsky, Jeffrey
L. Hjelm (orally), Bangor, for defendant
Before McKUSICK, CJ., and NICHOLS,
ROBERTS, VIOLETTE, GLASSMAN and
SCOLNIK, JJ.
VIOLETTE, Justice.
After a jury trial in the Superior Court,
Somerset County, the defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle after
his right to operate had been revoked because he was a habitual offender, 29 M.R.
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S.A. § 2298 (Supp.1984), and operating a
motor vehicle while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor, 29 M.R.S.A. § 1312-B
(Supp.1984). The sole issue on appeal is
whether the trial court erred when it refused to instruct the jury on the competing
harms defense, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 103
(1983). We determine that the court improperly denied the defendant's request for
such an instruction. We therefore sustain
the appeal.
On the afternoon of July 13, 1984, the
defendant, Linwood Knowles, and several
other people travelled to Skowhegan in a
van owned by Knowles. They drove to the
parking lot of the Midtown Hotel. Robert
Harris operated the van on this trip to
Skowhegan. Knowles's right to operate
had been revoked because he was a habitual offender, 29 M.R.S.A. § 2292 (Supp.
1984).
After the group arrived at the Midtown
parking lot, Knowles went alone to the
hotel bar. According to Knowles, he expected to meet a friend, Crystal, later at
the bar. With permission from the owner
of the Midtown, Knowles recorded some
music from the bar's jukebox with a tape
machine that he had brought with him.

Sergeant Asselin warned Knowles not to
start trouble at the Midtown and told him
not to drive anywhere. The sergeant informed Knowles that he would be on patrol
near the hotel bar in case there was any
problem.
Knowles then went back to his van in the
parking lot at the Midtown. There, he
spoke with Dwayne and Dorothy Bennett,
two people who had accompanied him on
the trip to Skowhegan that afternoon, and
who had returned to the van to wait for
him. Knowles told them that he was going
into the bar to find his friend Crystal and
that they would then all leave the Midtown.
Moody and his friends again assaulted
Knowles and would not let him enter the
bar. Dwayne Bennett went into the bar
and retrieved Knowles's tape machine for
him. At that point, Dwayne and Dorothy
Bennett left the area on foot.

At some point, there was a confrontation
between Knowles and another person at
the bar, Walter Moody. Moody and several
of his friends assaulted Knowles. Knowles
left the hotel area and called the Skowhegan Police Department to report the beating. The dispatcher, Antonio Lemieux, told
Knowles not to return to the hotel, and
that an officer might assist him if he came
to the police station. Knowles told Lemieux that he had to return to the Midtown
bar to get his keys. According to Lemieux,
Knowles sounded intoxicated.

Knowles testified that Crystal then appeared in the parking lot near his van. At
this point, Knowles stated, Moody and his
friends were still assaulting him. According to Knowles, Crystal got inside the van.
Knowles testified that he then got into the
passenger seat of the van. Knowles stated
that either Dwayne Bennett or Crystal had
retrieved his keys from inside the bar. According to Knowles, he then told Crystal to
drive to a nearby pay phone to call the
State Police. Knowles testified that Crystal drove the van over to the pay phone.
Upon seeing Moody and his friends approaching them, Knowles stated, he began
to look for his shotgun in his van to defend
himself and Crystal, who was attempting
to use the pay phone. Knowles testified
that he was in the driver's seat of the van
when he saw a police cruiser arrive at the
scene.

Knowles then returned to the Midtown
bar. He was again assaulted by Moody
and his friends. After this beating,
Knowles walked to the Skowhegan Police
Department to seek assistance. He spoke
with Sergeant Asselin. Both Sergeant
Asselin and Antonio Lemieux observed
Knowles to be very intoxicated at this time.

After Knowles had left the Skowhegan
Police Station, Sergeant Asselin had driven
to and parked at a point where he could
observe the parking lot of the Midtown bar.
The sergeant later observed Knowles's van
proceeding through this parking lot Sergeant Asselin then followed the van and
pulled up next to it at a point where it had
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stopped. Sergeant Asselin testified that
the driver was the only person he observed
in the van when he was following it, and
that Knowles was seated behind the steering wheel when he pulled up next to the
van. The sergeant further stated that,
when he arrived, there was no female in
the area who could have been Crystal. According to Sergeant Asselin, Knowles, who
was still intoxicated, stated that he drove
the van to save someone's life. The sergeant then placed Knowles under arrest.
Knowles maintained that he never operated the van. According to Knowles, Crystal disappeared shortly after the police
cruiser arrived.
At the close of the evidence at trial, the
defendant asked the presiding justice to
instruct the jury on the defense of competing harms under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 103.1
The justice determined, however, that, because the defendant testified that he did
not operate the van, he was not entitled to
an instruction that his operation of the van
could be justified under the doctrine of
competing harms. The defendant renewed
his request before the jury retired to deliberate. The justice again refused to give
the instruction.

In the case at bar, the presiding justice
did not even reach this question of whether
the competing harms defense was generated by the evidence. Rather, the justice
refused to give the instruction because he
determined, as a matter of law, that a
defendant who denies that he committed
the crime cannot also assert the inconsistent defense that he did commit the crime
because he "believefd] it to be necessary to
avoid imminent physical harm to himself or
another," 17-A M.R.S.A. § 103(1).

[1] A defendant is entitled to a jury
instruction on a particular defense when he
"can point to the existence of . . . evidence
sufficient to make the existence of all the
facts constituting the defense a reasonable
hypothesis for the factfinder to entertain."
State v. Glidden, 487 A.2d 642, 644 (Me.
1985); see State v. Reed, 459 A.2d 178,181
(Me.1983); State v. Bahre, 456 A.2d 860,
866 (Me.1983); State v. Greenwald, 454
A.2d 827, 830 (Me.1982). This is true
whether it is the prosecution or the defendant or both who produce the relevant evidence. Glidden, 487 A.2d at 644; State v.
Kee, 398 A.2d 384, 386 (Me.1979).

[2-4] "Generally, inconsistent defenses
may be interposed in a criminal case."
State v. Harris, 189 Conn. 268, 271, 455
A.2d 342, 344 (1983); see United States v.
King, 587 F.2d 956, 965 (9th Cir.1978);
Johnson v. United States, 426 F.2d 651,
656 (D.C.Cir.1970) (per curiam); cf. M.R.
Crim.P. 11(a) ("A defendant may plead both
not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity to the same charge."). 'The rule in
favor of inconsistent defenses reflects the
belief of modern criminal jurisprudence
that a criminal defendant should be accorded every reasonable protection in defending
himself against governmental prosecution.'' United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d
981, 985 (9th Cir.1975) (en banc). Reliance
upon a particular defense by the defendant
should not automatically relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove all the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 986; People v.
Perez, 62 Cal.2d 769, 776, 44 Cal.Rptr. 326,
329, 401 P.2d 934, 938 (1965); Harris, 189
Conn, at 271-276, 455 A.2d at 344-45;
State v. Branam, 161 N J.Super. 53, 59-62,
390 A.2d 1186, 1190-91, affd 79 N J . 301,
399 A.2d 299 (1978). Similarly, the denial
of the criminal act by the defendant should
not relieve the prosecution of its burden to
negate any defense generated by the evidence.2 See King, 587 F.2d at 965 (defend-

1. Section 103(1), in pertinent part, provides:
Conduct which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid imminent physical harm to himself or another is justifiable if the desirability
and urgency of avoiding such harm outweigh,
according to ordinary standards of reason-

ableness, the harm sought to be prevented by
the statute defining the crime charged.
2. The State must disprove beyond a reasonable
doubt the existence of any defense generated by
the evidence. 17-A M.R.SJV. § 101(1) (1983);
see Glidden, 487 A.2d at 644.
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ant's denial of drug transfer could not relieve prosecution of burden of refuting evidence that alleged transfer, if made by
defendant, was in the course of his professional practice).
The State, however, insists that "it is . . .
against logic and common sense" to allow a
defendant to assert the competing harms
defense after he denies that he committed
the crime. For authority, the State relies
exclusively upon decisions concerning
whether a defendant who denies the underlying criminal conduct may also invoke the
defense of entrapment
[5] Although many courts have refused
to permit a defendant who denies the underlying criminal conduct to rely upon the
entrapment defense as well, the decisions
are "both literally and figuratively spread
all over the map on this question." United
States v. Valencia, 645 F.2d 1158, 1170 (2d
Cir.l980).s We express no opinion ourselves regarding whether a defendant in
Maine may rely upon the entrapment defense if he denies that he engaged in the
criminal act. It is sufficient for us to say
that there is nothing about the competing
harms defense that would prompt us in this
case to depart from the principle that a
defendant may assert inconsistent defenses.

defenses to the fact finder, however, as
long as there is evidence, from whatever
source, that could rationally support those
defenses.
[8] W« conclude that the trial court
erred by refusing to instruct the jury on
the competing harms defense because of its
determination, as a matter of law, that the
defendant could not assert inconsistent defenses. If the competing harms defense
was generated by the evidence, from whatever source, the defendant was entitled to
an-instruction on it, regardless of the fact
that he denied committing the underlying
criminal acts.
The entry is:
Judgment vacated.
Remanded for proceedings consistent
with the opinion herein.
All concurring.
| XtYNUMItR SYSTEM
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[6,71 We note that the assertion of inconsistent defenses may be an unwise4 and
therefore unlikely tactical choice.5 See
Demma, 523 F.2d at 985. The prosecution
is free to point out such an inconsistency in
the defendant's case during trial and in
argument. State v. Hinds, 485 A.2d 231,
238-39 (Me. 1984). The defendant should
have the option of presenting inconsistent

Defendant invoked an exception to the
final judgment rule in order to appeal from

3. Federal and state cases, respectively, dealing
with this topic are collected at Annot.. 54 A.L.R.
Fed. 644 (1981). and Annot., 5 A.L.R.4th 1128
(1981).

F.2d 1044, 1048 (7th Cir.1984) (quoting United
States v. Kaiser, 138 F.2d 219, 220 (7th Cir.
1943)), rev'd on other grounds, 471 VS.
,
105 S.Ct. 2084, 85 L.Ed.2d 434 (1985).

4. In the context of the entrapment defense, one
court has gone so far as to remark that "it is
difficult to conceive of a competent attorney
arguing to a court and jury that the defendant
did not [commit the criminal act], but, if so, he
was entrapped." United States v. Liparota, 735

5. Illustrative is State v. Boilard, where the defendant made a "tactical decision not to argue
. . . justification [under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 104
(1983) ], for fear of weakening the primary defense of denial of assaultive conduct." 488 A.2d
1380, 1390-91 (Me.1985).
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STATE of Vermont
v.
Roger L DAPO.
No. 82-201.
Supreme Court of Vermont
Dec. 2, 1983.
Defendant was convicted in the District Court, Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit,
Alden T. Bryan, J., of operating motor vehicle while under influence of intoxicating
liquor, and he appealed. The Supreme
Court, Billings, CJ., held that: (1) delay of
37 days between impaneling of jurors and
trial was not prejudicial, and (2) trial court
did not err in failing to charge defense of
necessity.
Affirmed.
1. Criminal Law <$=» 854(2)
In misdemeanor cases, discretion of trial court controls issue of separation of jury,
and burden of demonstrating abuse of this
discretion is on party claiming the abuse,
but all that is required is showing of existence of circumstances capable of prejudicing deliberative function of jury and not
that jury was prejudiced in fact.
2. Criminal Law <*=>854(1)
Each case involving separation of jury
will be decided on its own facts.
3. Criminal Law <*=» 1174(4)
In prosecution for driving under the
influence, delay of 37 days between jury
impaneling and swearing-in did not require
reversal where defendant's counsel was allowed to conduct second voir dire at time of
trial and, after conducting the voir dire,
expressed his client's satisfaction with the
jury, where defendant verbally and in writing agreed to proceed with the 11-member
jury when two of the jurors were unavailable on day set for trial, and where there
was no showing of any circumstance that
might have occurred during separation that

was capable of tainting jury's deliberative
duty. 23 V.S.A. § 1201(aX2); U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 6.
4. Jury <*=»9
Defendant's right to trial by properly
constituted and impartial jury is constitutionally guaranteed and must not be threatened by mere administrative convenience in
advance drawing of juries.
5. Criminal Law <s=>38
Elements of defense of necessity are:
there must be situation of emergency arising without fault on part of actor concerned, the emergency must be so imminent
and compelling as to raise reasonable expectation of harm to actor or upon those he
was protecting, the emergency must
present no reasonable opportunity to avoid
injury without doing criminal act, and injury impending from emergency must be of
sufficient seriousness to outmeasure criminal wrong.
6. Criminal Law <s=>772(6)
In prosecution for driving under the
influence, trial court did not err in failing
to charge defense of necessity where, even
if defendant's missing child represented an
emergency, defendant knew that emergency had terminated and his child was safe at
home at time of his arrest.
7. Criminal Law <s=> 1134(3)
Claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be brought through collateral attack under postconviction proceedings rather than on direct appellate review.

Dena Monahan, Chittenden County Deputy State's Atty., Burlington, for plaintiffappellee.
Saxer, Anderson & Wolinsky, Burlington,
for defendant-appellant
Before BILLINGS, CJ., and HILL, UNDERWOOD, PECK and GIBSON, JJ.
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BILLINGS, Chief Justice.
Defendant appeals from a conviction of
operating a motor vehicle while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor (DUI). 23
V.S.A. § 1201(aX2). He asserts three
claims of error: (1) that the delay of 37
days between jury impaneling and swearing-in was prejudicial as a matter of law;
(2) that the trial court failed to charge the
jury with the defense of necessity; and (3)
that he was prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel.
Around 11:50 p.m. on November 20,1981,
defendant was awakened by a telephone
call from his ex-wife, informing him that
one of their children had failed to return to
her home from a daytime outing. Defendant borrowed a car and proceeded to look
far his son, eventually meeting up with him
at the Burlington police station. Shortly
after returning his son to his ex-wife's
home, defendant was stopped by a Burlington police officer, taken to the police station
and processed for DUI.
On February 22, 1982, a jury of thirteen
was drawn, but not sworn, for defendant's
March 31, 1982, trial. On the day set for
trial, only eleven of the thirteen jurors were
available. The trial judge and defendant's
attorney questioned defendant both as to
his understanding that he had a constitutional right to a twelve member jury and
that a mistrial would be declared if he did
not then wish to go forward with the trial.
After the defendant indicated his willingness to go forward, the trial judge questioned him further to insure that the prospect of increased litigation costs, if a mistrial were declared, was not compelling defendant's decision to proceed with the eleven member jury. Although defendant expressed some concern over litigation costs,
he again expressed his willingness to go
forward and signed a statement acknowledging his voluntary waiver of his right to
a twelve member jury. The trial court then
allowed defendant's counsel to voir dire the
jury, after which defendant's counsel indicated satisfaction with the jury as constituted.

[1,2] In misdemeanor cases, the discretion of the trial court controls the issue of
separation of the jury. State v. White, 129
Vt. 220,225-26, 274 A.2d 690, 693-94 (1971).
"[I]t is for the trial court to weigh concern
for the prompt, orderly administration of
criminal law against the possibility of jury
prejudice in a given case." State v. Brisson, 124 Vt. 211, 214, 201 A.2d 881, 883
(1964). The burden of demonstrating an
abuse of this discretion is on the party
claiming the abuse, but all that is required
is a showing of "the existence of circumstances capable of prejudicing the deliberative function of the jury," and not that the
jury was prejudiced in fact. Id. at 215, 201
A.2d at 883. Each case involving the separation of the jury will be decided on its own
facts. Id. at 214, 201 A.2d at 883.
In State v. White, supra, 129 Vt. at 226,
274 A.2d at 694, this Court held that a
separation of 62 days between impaneling
and trial was prejudicial as a matter of law.
The defendant in White had been charged
with possession of a regulated drug, marijuana. 18 V.S.A. § 4224(a). The separation of the jury occurred during a time
when marijuana, because of the perceived
novelty of its use, was a very sensitive and
much touted issue. Id. at 225, 274 A.2d at
693. In State v. Brisson, supra, 124 Vt at
214, 201 A.2d at 883, a jury separation of
ten days, in a misdemeanor case, was found
not to be prejudicial as a matter of law, nor
on the facts of that particular case. Prior
to the jury's separation, the court had cautioned the jury members to avoid activities
which might prejudice its deliberative function. Id. at 212,201 A.2d at 882. Additionally, at trial, the defendant did not demonstrate the occurrence of any event during
separation that might have tainted the
jury's impartiality. Id. at 214, 201 AJ2d at
883. Similarly, in State v. Stevens, 137 V t
473, 408 A.2d 622 (1979), a sixteen day
separation in a DUI case was held not to be
prejudicial where the court conducted a
second voir dire at the trial's commencement and offered to treat defendant's motion to dismiss as a motion for mistrial if
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any improper influence affecting the jury
could be demonstrated. Id. at 476, 408 A.2d
at 624.
[3] In the instant case, the record is
silent as to whether the court admonished
the jury, prior to separation, to avoid any
activity that might affect its impartiality.
However, the court did allow defendant's
counsel to conduct a second voir dire at the
time of trial. On the basis of this voir dire,
counsel for defendant expressed his client's
satisfaction with the jury as constituted.
Defendant, verbally and in writing, agreed
to proceed with the eleven member jury.
Additionally, there was no showing of any
circumstance that may have occurred during separation that was capable of tainting
the jury's deliberative duty. Finally, defendant made no claim of error in this
regard until after the verdict. Considering
the totality of circumstances, we cannot say
that the defendant has demonstrated the
existence of prejudice in law or fact. The
trial court was acting within its discretion
when it proceeded with the trial.
[4] We do, once again however, express
strong concern and reservation as to the
continued propriety of advance drawing of
juries. We recognize the increasing burdens on trial court calendars, but a defendant's right to a trial by a properly constituted and impartial jury is constitutionally
guaranteed and must not be threatened by
mere administrative convenience. The
shorter the period of separation, the less
likely that prejudice and abuse of discretion
will be found on appeal.
[5] Defendant next claims that the trial
court erred in failing to instruct on the
defense of necessity. Defendant did not
request the charge but properly claims that
the trial court must fully and correctly
charge upon each point indicated by the
evidence that is material to a decision of the
case. State v. Gokey, 136 Vt. 33, 36, 383
A.2d 601, 602 (1978). The defense of necessity, as recognized in Vermont, requires evidence in the record that supports the elements of the defense. State v. Shotton, 142

Vt. 558, 561, 458 A.2d 1105, 1106 (1983).
These elements are:
(1) there must be a situation of emergency arising without fault on the part of
the actor concerned;
(2) this emergency must be so imminent
and compelling as to raise a reasonable
expectation of harm, either directly to
the actor or upon those he was protecting;
(3) this emergency must present no reasonable opportunity to avoid the injury
without doing the criminal act; and
(4) the injury impending from the emergency must be of sufficient seriousness to
outmeasure the criminal wrong.
Id. at 560-61, 458 A.2d at 1105 (quoting
State v. Warshow, 138 Vt. 22, 24, 410 A.2d
1000, 1001-02 (1980)).
[6] The court did not err in failing to
charge the defense of ne<£ssity. Certainly
defendant's missing child was an occurrence
that arose without fault attributable to
him. And, a missing child could very well
represent an emergency so imminent and
compelling as to raise a reasonable expectation of harm either to the actor or to the
child. However, under the facts of this
case, at the time of defendant's criminal
activity, the emergency had already terminated and, as the defendant knew, his child
was safe at home.
[7] We do not reach defendant's third
claim, that of ineffective assistance of counsel. Such a claim must be brought through
collateral attack under post-conviction proceedings, rather than on direct appellate
review. State v. Loehmann, 143 Vt. 372,467
A.2d 118 (1983); State v. Campanelli, 142
Vt. 362, 366, 454 A.2d 1248, 1251 (1982).
Affirmed.

ADDENDUM E

ROGER K. SCOWCROFT
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
Attorney for Defendant
424 East 500 South, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5444
IN THE JUSTICE COURT OF PRECINCT NO. TWO,
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
-V-

GILBERTO GONZALES,

Case No. 2-1983-121B

Defendant*
The d e f e n d a n t , GILBERTO GONZALES, by and through h i s / h e r
a t t o r n e y of r e c o r d , ROGER K. SCOWCROFT, p u r s u a n t t o Utah Code Ann.
S e c t i o n 77-35-16 (1953 as amended) and the Due Process of Clauses of

C o n s t i t u t i o n s of Utah and the United S t a t e s , hereby requests the
following m a t e r i a l s be provided to him ten days prior to t r i a l now
s e t for September 27, 1988.
1.

Any evidence which tends to negate the g u i l t of the

defendant, or mitigate the g u i l t of the defendant or mitigate the
degree of the offense for reduced punishment t h a t has been
discovered by any member of the agencies involved in the
i n v e s t i g a t i o n or prosecution of the above-entitled case.
2.

A l i s t of a l l the witnesses t h a t the State /City

intends to c a l l for t r i a l in the above-entitled matter, t h e i r
a d d r e s s e s , telephone numbers and criminal records.

3.

Any recordings, r e p o r t s , t r a n s c r i p t s or reports about

statements in possession

of any member, o-r group involved in the

p r o s e c u t i o n of the i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the above-entitled case taken
from the witness l i s t e d in number 2.
4.

Any photographs or physical evidence from the alleged

crime scene or taken by any such law enforcement officer procured
during the course of the i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the above e n t i t l e d case by
such police department, County Attorney, i t s s t a f f or i n v e s t i g a t i v e
agencies*
5.

Statements made by the defendant t o any of the

S t a t e ' s witnesses and the d a t e s , times, places and persons present
when such statements were made.
6.

Any r e p o r t s or r e s u l t s of s c i e n t i f i c t e s t s taken

during the i n v e s t i g a t i o n of t h i s case*
7.

Any reports made by non-governmental agencies

involved including reports made by any s t a t e s e c u r i t y personnel.
8.

Any police or i n v e s t i g a t i v e r e p o r t s , excluding the

S a l t Lake County Attorney's or Salt Lake City Prosecutor's work
p r o d u c t , made during the course of the i n v e s t i g a t i o n or prosecution
of t h i s c a s e .
9.

Reports or d e s c r i p t i o n s or any weapon or other

p h y s i c a l evidence seized from defendant's person or his residence or
vehicle t h a t the S t a t e / C i t y intends to use at t r i a l .
10.

Any offers of leniency or plea bargain agreements or

any other form of remuneration provided to any of the witnesses
l i s t e d in number 2 and 3 above.
11.

A copy of the booking s h e e t .

11 •

A copy of the booking s h e e t .

WHEREFORE, defendant moves that the Court issue an Order
granting the r e l i e f

sought.

DATED t h i s ^ ^ d a y

of August, 1988,

ROGER KT^COWCROFT
Attorney for Defendan
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Request for
Discovery t o the o f f i c e

of the South Valley county Attorney's

O f f i c e , 2001 South S t a t e , #S3700, S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 841190-1200
t h i s C X f f a y of August, 1988.

ADDENDUM P

DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
By: W.C. GWYNN
Deputy County Attorney
2001 South State, Room #S3700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200
Telephone: (801) 468-3422

IN THE JUSTICE COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SECOND PRECINCT
THE STATE OF UTAH,

)

Plaintiff,

)

INFORMATION

v.

)

Case No: 2-1984

GILBERTO A. GONZALES
DOB: 06/14/42

)

CAO NO. 88-3-03914

)

Defendant.
The undersigned, DEPUTY BAIRD - S.O., under oath states on
information and belief that the defendant(s) committed the crimes of:
COUNT I
DRIVING OR BEING IN ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL OF A MOTOR VEHICLE WHILE
HAVING A BLOOD ALCOHOL CONTENT OF 0.08 PERCENT OR GREATER; OR WHILE
UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS, a Class B Misdemeanor,
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about August 4, 1988, in
violation of Title 41, Chapter 6, Section 44, Utah Code Annotated,
19 53, as amended, in that the defendant, GILBERTO A. GONZALES, a
party to the offense, did appear or was in actual physical control
of a motor vehicle within this state while having a blood or breath
alcohol content of 0.08 percent or greater, by weight, as shown by a
chemical test given within two hours after the alleged operation or
physical control or while under the influence of alcohol or any drug
or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree which
rendered the defendant incapable of safely operating a vehicle.

INFORMATION
State vs. GILBERTO A. GONZALES
C.A.O. Case No. 88-3-03914
Page 2
THIS INFORMATION
WITNESSES:

IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING

Deputy Fred Baird 673E S.O.
Citation #D09076
DEFENDANT'S ADDRESS:

4311 West 4985 South, Kearns, Utah

84118

Affiant
Subscribed and sworn to before me
this
day of August, 1988.

JUDGE
Authorized for presentment and filing:
DAVID E. YOCOM,
Salt Lake County Attorney
/s/W.C. GWYNN
Deputy County Attorney
sk/08-31-88/1955I
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CITATION NO.

D 09076
DUI REPORT FORM
CASE IDENTIFICATION^/
„
D^^-^^fnay77;6^^Acr,i
Subject's Name fa Lfb>s£n> 'A

Place of Employment f-tit-fatJ

r

_,
.
2
^
2
2
&
T
i
m
e
Prepared__2Z?Vr
na Q # J
Address ^ 3 / / /j/&rr~t/9J><r&u-&,
^faog.

/U>
i p n t
&AJ-Z*ie*-

/faifcC-i-JtC^

Address

Home Telephone Number 967"3o
"7/
Work Telephone Number tt*Ui*S /h-fe<——jk&*~
D.O.B. &-H~tWXDriver License # /¥£??4>fV5
TimeptArrest QoVS}*^
" ^ ^
Place of Arrest 3 g o o Jocfi% q ^ t ? ^ a ; 7
ChaJgp*
Z7^^
Arresting Officer HceD
&4*kt>
Assisting Officers K&J
PAOZ&
Arresting Agency
SLG>t>°
VEHICLE
^
Year
jT?-S

,
Color 6*"™

License #' and state ^ ^

Registersd Owner

^

<

Make

~T5^C^~

&1U>S&no

C

* i
**> tlC+C,

Modei

* . ^
Oe^tCOT

Disppsitinn Slfo7£r"tt-C—/?

A> G**j-*A'LgZ.

Address V 3 / / CUezT

WITNESSES: (If passengers, indicate specifically)
Name
Address

Ct£T

VPfSTJausZ

Te!s. #

Age/DOB

1.
2.

a
4.
5.
ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL:
establishing the subject's actual physical control of a motor vehicle ara: OxJky
Thei facts establish

f>4- C/e&.ttUe'-

p&csoA/#tCy

od<s*±n*) A/L>. adi,*s4

DRIVING PATTERN:
.
Subject's location when first observed 3 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ BCrO ^ 7
The facts observed regarding driving pattern: OfoeXJjeb Suz/te&~~

JF c&7v4/'<vusf> IT

/5CU,J

Scjsfir.er

oet/cter

jlt.<J

I'lGWtT

0&\','cUr

,

v

PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS,
Odor of alcoholic beverage _ 5 E f ^ £ i .
Speech SCVJLL'J?
- t,**y c{'P£ffuC*TT' u^acsT***
Balance sTfr*w,/S£go F>2IJ,A.'C /s<*£/cl(rj? D?*4?Cu 6tf/*'
Signs or complaints of injury or illness
AAj.tJCz
^

Other physical characteristics C^A/fV

r__

dcm/.Z't

fZ*u~> 3on &C7~ 7c

k/

PRE-ARREST
STATEMENTS
OF SUBJECT:
*>Jtyjiff Aft
fa<2~.

dCCU/^^7

r/edfrit*- L/esr~ Zalvsi

SHU,*

S-fofe-*¥.

T

—JUvsJ-rf- <ytrs>
sw»<4«vf
,

/ blcjr

Sfat, A /

sLtX-

1

rt>kwcgV

'

J

^uC/^ ^ V "

;

tfdJc?1

ry<S-

b^4vt&>

V-j-fK-fc * M * 9 ^ / A -

A-lws/

' Tnuckefo Bleats

Were tests .demonstrated by officer? ^25

Subject's ability to follow instructions

SEARCHES
A.
Vehicle:
C /J
Was subject's vehicle searched? y£5
Where? 37<MJou44x
Whfln? OoZD,kwK
Evidence / > W g * "

o o> LJ£zz/~~
J.^ <"&/

Person who performed the search
8.

Subject:
Was subject's oerson searched? \j<?>
When? COVi
frw.
Evidence
WhAn?
/ X ? V * //V>WCwjHflncfl Found
Fnunr
Person who performed the search

Wh"ie? J4&0
A/<frU&

^
/
Jdu-tf*

& *-~
^

z

i ~7
M&'

CHEMICAL T E S T S L ,
. ,
Mr. or Mrs. C A - b&Ctv fi-, Qr<nu2,ACG> £^0 y o u understand thai you are under arrest for
driving under the influence of alcohol (drugs)? Response, (if any)
I hereby request that you submit Jo a c h e m ^ l test to determine the alcohol (drug) content of your blood. I
request that you take a
JL>tJ~faj-l i / £ # ^ ~
test.
(blood-breath-urine)
D

The following admonition was given by me to the subject before the chemical test was administered:
Results Indicating .OR°/o or more by weight of alcohol in your blood shall, and the existence of a olood
alcohol content cr presence of drugs sufficient to render you incapable of safely driving a vehie'e may,
result in suspension or revocation of your license cr privilege to operate a motor vehicle.

What is your respense to my request that you submit to a chemical test? Response:

Did subject submit to a chemical test? ^ j ^ S
Test Administered by s f)<£t>
S>./fr/Cf>
1
TimeOl 3T/ft»%^
Results * ^X>
Serial No. of test machine: Cfif^C0/&

0 kc\^s

Type of tosL
Where?
yX+fpr,
oJ-frrtZ'
Was subject notified of results?_\^5

(

(if the subject refuses the test, read the following)
•

The following admonition was given by me to the subject:
If you refuse the test, it will not be given, however I must warn you that if you refuse, your license or
permit to drive a motor vehicle may be revoked for one year with no provisioj«ror a limited driver's license.
After you have taken this test, you will be permitted to have a physician of your own choice administer
a test at vour own exoense, in addition to the one I haw reauested vcu to submit to. so lona a* it dc^*

(If the subject c i y i j s the right to remain silent or the righ""":; counsel, read the following:)
•

The following admonition was given by me to the subject:
Your right to remain silent and your right to counsel do not apply to the implied consent law which
is civil in nature and.separate from the criminal charges. Your right to remain silent does not give you
the right to refuse to take the test. You do not have the right to have counsel during the test procedure.
Unless you submit to the test I am requesting, 1 will consider that you have refused to take the test.
I warn you that if you refuse to take the test, your driver's license can be revoked for one year with
no provision for a limited license.

XI.

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS:
~JWas subject advised of the following rights? y€b
When
0)
pV^~
r~BvWhom?
J=*jgQ
fc^rs^fr
Where? TXsH&C
<?WrC&r
Jy~ 1. You have the right to remain silent.
y ^ - 2. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law.
You have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him present with you while you are oeing questioned. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you before
any questioning, if you wish one.
If you decide to answer questions now without having counsel present, you may stop answering questions at any time. Also, you may request counsel at any time during quest;oning.
following waiver questions asked?.
Do you understand each of these rights t have explained to you?
Response
\IP)$/L
Having these richts In mindydo you wish to talk to us now?
Response
IT~ C (A^
INTERVIEW:
Were you operating a vehicle?? _. y ® ^
Where were you going?
frW
) ^ i ^ ^
y
.
.
What street or highway were you on? ^?<7g So^^k - J * (hsJT
ATf^^J
Direction of travel?
(o fc*Y Attn; sc
,
Where did you start from? 7 T (JM*L
*£>-O K&$
*4/<~ fay ^ ^
When? 7 oKClocA^
What time is it now?
^ OK3 c
cttctij
What is today's date?
/UL<1 U S~t 3>
Day of week? -~JT'{e^/0f4^j
r
(Actual time
OI *°]Ar^
Date
f~- U—££__
Day
J^^uus/j^y
What city or county are you in now?
l
T
DO«JT
/X(<y<^
Z_
n
What were you doing during the last three hours? _ ^ / ) 0 KI'+LL
^ L
t^y
S**?L

Have you been drinking?
What?
&eF*L^

yVMA-x
~

How much?

.
3 ~0<- ¥ K&I&5

When did you have ycur first rJrir.k? /ff
M W / 4 ^ 3 ^ _ _ Last drink? * 7 ~ / /
Are you under the influence of an alcoholic beverage (drugs) now?

Are you taking tranquilizers, pills,/medicines or drugs of any Ivind?
(What kind? Get sample)
VIAWhen did you have the last dose?
^Idr
Are you ill?
M°
(If subject was in an accident, ask these questions:)
jj/j
Were you involved in an acciaert today?
\Z1 ..

&0

XH.

OTHER OCCURRENCES OR FACTS:

,

X1U.

ATTACHED DOCUMENTS:
I have attached the following documents to this report:
1. ^?»Copy of citation/temporary license
2. ^ S u b j e c t ' s Utah driver's license or driver's permit
3. • Traffic accident report
<\ D Other documents (specify)

i hereby certify that I am a sworn Utah Peace Officer and that the information contained above in this report form and attached
documents is true and correct to rny knowledge and belief and that this report form was prepared in the regular course of my
duties. It is my belief the subject was in violation of section 41-6-44 U.C.A. at the date, time, and place specified in this report.

Signatuie of Peace Officer
Law Enforcement Agency:
Eats:

673^

a<«.
<~

/ /" C
^ ^ ^ ^
^

?-r-f?PpTto*.

QZ^At^,

The original of this form must be sent within five (5) days of the arrest of the subject to:
Driver License Division
4501 South 2700 West
P.O. Box 30560
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130-0560

ADDENDUM G

IN THE JUSTICE COURT

IH AND FOR THE

COUWTT OF SALT IAKB

2nd

PRECDTCT

STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE GF OTAH
v

*

)

Gilberto Gonzales
dob 6/4/42
Defendant

CERTIFIED COPT OP DOCKET EtfIRT

1
)

2-1984-98A

August 17, 1988

Filed: Citation #D09076. Gilberto Gonzales charged
with DUI on August 4, 1988 by Deputy Fred
Baird.
Ent'd Order:Defendant arraigned. Plead Not Guilty.
Defendant assigned Legal Defender. Pre-Trial
set September 27, 1988 03:15 PM.

September 27, 1988

Entfd Order: Pre-trial held. County Attorney, Woody Guynn
Legal Defender, Roger Scowcroft present. Unable to
resolve. Motion Hearing set October 18, 1988 ^ : 3 0 AM.
Legal Defender assessment fee $50.00 to be pd 9/30/88.

Sept ember 30, 1988

Paid: $50.00 Legal Defender fee on Receipt #544096.

October 18, 1989

Ent'd Order: On joint motion of County Attorney & Legal
Defender, Jury was not called. Hearing held on
Motions. Both attorneys are to file motions with
the court as soon as possible.
Set Jury .Trial January 12, 1989 08:30 A.M.
Filed: Motion & MerDrandum in Support of Defendants
Motion to Instruct.
Ent'd Order: Continue Jury Trial. County Attorney has
not answered defendants Motions.

January 12, 1989

Page 1
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT U K E

)
)
)

ra«

2nd
I, Phyllis J, Scott
f Justice of the Peace, In and for the
Precinct, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, do hereby certify that the
above is a full and correct cop7 of the record of the above proceed*
ings in the above case as it appears in the docket of ny Court.

Dated

May 8, 1989
Justice of the Peace

IH THE JUSTICE COORT

IN AHD H E THE

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

2nd

HtBCDrCT

STATE OP UTAH

THE STATE G? UTAH
Gilberto*Gonzales
jilberto
dob 6/4/42

>

CEBTIPIED COPT OP DOOET DTTRT

Defendant
2-1984-98A

Cont,
March 2, 1989

Entfd Order: Jury w&s not called. Set for
Change of Plea on April 25, 1989 <§8:30A.M.

April 25, 1989

Entfd Order: Defendant appeared with counsel, Roger
Scowcroft and County Attorney, Vfoody Gwynn present.
Entered into a "No Contest" plea in order to appeal
within 30 days.
Sentencing as follows: DUI- $480.00 + $120 Surcharge
+ $100 VR + $50 AR fee + 60 days in jail/57 days suspended on 1. Payment of fines & fees-to be determined .
after stay date. 2. DUI series to be determined after
stay date. 3. Probation to court 6 months- other 3
days are suspended on 24 hours comnunity service.

April 28, 1989

Filed: Notice of Appeal,Certificate of Probable Cause
and Order to Stay Execution.

May 8, 1989

Mailed: Certified Copy of the TDocket and file to
Judge Floyd Gowans, Presiding Judge, Third Circuit
Court, Salt Lake City, Utah

Page
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
I#

Phyllis J. Scott

i

aa,

)
f J u 5 t l c e o f th<J

p ^ ^ ^

^

foy th0

2nd

Precinct, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, do hereby certify that the
above la a full and correct copy of the record of the above proceed*
ings In the above case aa It appears in the docket of my Court.

Dated

7 •

;*' < • >

Justice of the Peace
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TEXTS OF STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
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41-6-43.10

MOTOR VEHICLES

(2) An ordinance adopted by a local authority that governs reckless driving,
or operating a vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons
or property shall be consistent with the provisions of this code which govern
those matters.
History* C. 1953, 41-6-43, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 99, § 11; 1987, ch. 138, § 36.
Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1978,
ch. 33, § 54 repealed old § 41-6-43 (L. 1941, ch.
52, § 33; C. 1943, 57-7-110; L. 1957, ch. 75,
§ 1; 1967, ch. 88, § 1; 1969, ch. 107, § 1), relating to powers of local authorities as to driving
while intoxicated and reckless driving, and a
new § 41-6-43 was enacted by Laws 1979, ch.
242, § 12.

Laws 1983, ch. 99, § 11 repealed former
§ 41-6-43 (L. 1979, ch. 242, § 12), relating to
powers of local authorities, and enacted
present § 41-6-43.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment substituted "operating" for "driving"
both places it appears in this section and made
minor changes in punctuation.
Cross-References. — Traffic regulations,
powers and duties of cities as to, § 10-8-30.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Effect of interim repeal.
Powers of cities.
Effect of interim repeal.
The interim repeal of this section did not
render municipalities without authority to
enact ordinances prohibiting driving under the
influence of alcohol as municipalities had authority under their general police powers to
enact such ordinances in the absence of a spe-

cific legislative grant of authority. Layton City
v. Glines, 616 P.2d 588 (Utah 1980).
Powers of cities.
City held to have power to pass ordinance
prohibiting driving while intoxicated, notwithstanding statute on the subject. Salt Lake City
v. Kusse, 97 Utah 113, 93 P.2d 671 (1938).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 296 et seq.

41-6-43.10.

C.J.S. — 61A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles §§ 625
to 637.
Key Numbers. — Automobiles <= 332.

Repealed.

Repeals. — Section 41-6-43.10 (L. 1955, ch.
71, § 1; 1957, ch. 78, § 2; 1983, ch. 99, § 12),

relating to negligent homicide, was repealed
by Laws 1985 (1st S.S.), ch. 1, § 2.

41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol or drug or
with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration — Measurement of blood or breath alcohol
— Criminal punishment — Arrest without warrant — Penalties — Suspension or revocation of
license.
(1) (a) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this section for any
person to operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within this
state if the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08
grams or greater as shown by a chemical test given within two hours
416

TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS

41-6-44

after the alleged operation or physical control, or if the person is under
the influence of alcohol or any drug or the combined influence of alcohol
and any drug to a degree which renders the person incapable of safely
operating a vehicle.
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has
been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any
charge of violating this section.
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol
per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall be
based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
(3) (a) Every person who is convicted the first time of a violation of Subsection (1) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. But if the person has inflicted a
bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of having operated the
vehicle in a negligent manner, he is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(b) In this section, the standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of care which an ordinarily
reasonable and prudent person exercises under like or similar circumstances.
(4) In addition to any penalties imposed under Subsection (3), the court
shall, upon a first conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less
than 48 consecutive hours nor more than 240 hours, with emphasis on serving
in the drunk tank of the jail, or require the person to work in a communityservice work program for not less than 24 hours nor more than 50 hours and,
in addition to the jail sentence or the work in the community-service work
program, order the person to participate in an assessment and educational
series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility.
(5) (a) Upon a second conviction within five years after a first conviction
under this section or under a local ordinance similar to this section
adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43(1), the court shall, in addition to any penalties imposed under Subsection (3), impose a mandatory
jail sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours nor more than 720
hours, with emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail, or require
the person to work in a community-service work program for not less than
80 hours nor more than 240 hours and, in addition to the jail sentence or
the work in the community-service work program, order the person to
participate in an assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol
rehabilitation facility. The court may, in its discretion, order the person
to obtain treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility.
(b) Upon a subsequent conviction within five years after a second conviction under this section or under a local ordinance similar to this section adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43(1), the court shall, in
addition to any penalties imposed under Subsection (3), impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 720 nor more than 2,160 hours with
emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail, or require the person to
work in a community-service work program for not less than 240 nor
more than 720 hours and, in addition to the jail sentence or work in the
community-service work program, order the person to obtain treatment
at an alcohol rehabilitation facility.
(c) No portion of any sentence imposed under Subsection (3) may be
suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or probation
until any sentence imposed under this section has been served. Probation
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or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation of this section or a
local ordinance similar to this section adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43(1) may not be terminated and the department may not reinstate any license suspended or revoked as a result of the conviction, if it is
a second or subsequent conviction within five years, until the convicted
person has furnished evidence satisfactory to the department that all
fines and fees, including fees for restitution and rehabilitation costs, assessed against the person, have been paid.
(6) (a) The provisions in Subsections (4) and (5) that require a sentencing
court to order a convicted person to: participate in an assessment and
educational series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility; obtain, in
the discretion of the court, treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility;
or obtain, mandatorily, treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility; or
do any combination of those things, apply to a conviction for a violation of
Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior offense under Subsection (7). The
court is required to render the same order regarding education or treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility, or both, in connection with a
first, second, or subsequent conviction under Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior offense under Subsection (7), as the court would render in
connection with applying respectively, the first, second, or subsequent
conviction requirements of Subsections 41-6-44(4) and (5).
(b) For purposes of determining whether a conviction under Section
41-6-45 which qualified as a prior conviction under Subsection (7), is a
first, second, or subsequent conviction under this subsection, a previous
conviction under either this section or Section 41-6-45 is considered a
prior conviction.
(c) Any alcohol rehabilitation program and any community-based or
other education program provided for in this section shall be approved by
the Department of Social Services.
(7) (a) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to a
charge of a violation of Section 41-6-45 or of an ordinance enacted under
Subsection 41-6-43(1) in satisfaction of, or as a substitute for, an original
charge of a violation of this section, the prosecution shall state for the
record a factual basis for the plea, including whether or not there had
been consumption of alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both, by the
defendant in connection with the offense. The statement is an offer of
proof of the facts which shows whether there was consumption of alcohol
or drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant, in connection with
the offense.
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea offered under this subsection of the consequences of a violation of Section
41-6-45 as follows. If the court accepts the defendant's plea of guilty or no
contest to a charge of violating Section 41-6-45, and the prosecutor states
for the record that there was consumption of alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant in connection with the offense, the resulting conviction is a prior offense for the purposes of Subsection (5).
(c) The court shall notify the department of each conviction of Section
41-6-45 which is a prior offense for the purposes of Subsection (5).
(8) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation of
this section when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has
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occurred, although not in his presence, and if the officer has probable cause to
believe that the violation was committed by the person.
(9) The Department of Public Safety shall suspend for 90 days the operator's license of any person convicted for the first time under Subsection (1),
and shall revoke for one year the license of any person convicted of any subsequent offense under Subsection (1) if the violation is committed within a
period of five years from the date of the prior violation. The department shall
subtract from any suspension or revocation period the number of days for
which a license was previously suspended under Section 41-2-130, if the previous suspension was based on the same occurrence upon which the record of
conviction is based.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 34; C. 1943,
57-7-111; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1957, ch. 75,
§ 1; 1967, ch. 88, § 2; 1969, ch. 107, § 2; 1977,
ch. 268, § 3; 1979, ch. 243, § 1; 1981, ch. 63,
§ 2; 1982, ch. 46, § 1; 1983, ch. 99, § 13; 1983,
ch. 103, § 1; 1983, ch. 183, § 33; 1985, ch. 46,
§ 1; 1986, ch. 122, § 1; 1986, ch. 178, § 29;
1987, ch. 138, § 37; 1987 (1st S.S.), ch. 8, § 2;
1988, ch. 17, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amendment divided Subsection (3) into Subsections
(3)(a) and (3)(b); deleted "of this section" before
"shall be punished" in the first sentence of
Subsection (3)(a); divided the former first sentence of Subsection (3)(a) into the first and second sentences, substituting "But" for "except
that" at the beginning of the second sentence of
Subsection (3)(a); divided Subsection (5) into
Subsections (5)(a) through (5)(c); divided the
former first sentence of Subsection (5)(a) into
the first and second sentences; substituted
"may" for "shall" in three places in Subsection
(5)(c); deleted "such time as" after "probation
until" in the first sentence of Subsection (5)(c);
deleted "and unless" before "the convicted person" near the end of Subsection (5)(c); divided
Subsection (6) into Subsections (6)(a) and
(6)(b); deleted "of this section" at the end of
Subsections (7)(b) and (7)(c); substituted "the
officer has probable cause to believe the violation has occurred" for "the violation is coupled
with an accident or collision in which the person is involved and when the violation has, in
fact, been committed" in Subsection (8); substituted "probable" for "reasonable" near the end
of Subsection (8); deleted "a period of before
"90 days" and "of this section" before "and
shall revoke" in Subsection (9); and made
minor changes in phraseology, punctuation,
and style.
The 1986 amendment by Laws 1986, ch. 122,
in Subsection (4) deleted "for" following "provided" and substituted "240 hours" for "ten
days", "24 hours" for "two" and "80 hours" for
"ten days"; in Subsection (5)(a) substituted
"240" for "48", "720 hours" for "ten days", "80
hours" for "ten", and "240 hours" for "30 days";
and in Subsection (5)(b) substituted "720" for

"30", "2,160 hours" for "90 days", "240" for
"30", and "720 hours" for "90 days".
The 1986 amendment by Laws 1986, ch. 178,
in Subsection (3)(a), substituted the language
beginning "is guilty of a class B misdemeanor"
for "shall be punished by imprisonment for not
less than 60 days nor more than six months, or
by a fine of $299, or by both the fine and imprisonment" in the first sentence and the language beginning "is guilty of a class A misdemeanor" for "shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one
year, and, in the discretion of the court, by a
fine of not more than $1,000" in the second
sentence.
The 1987 amendment designated the previously undesignated provisions of Subsection (1)
as last amended by Laws 1986, ch. 178, § 29
and rewrote the provisions of Subsection (a) to
the Extent that a detailed analysis is impracticably; in Subsection (2) added the phrase following "centimeters of blood"; in Subsection
(3)(a) deleted "imprisonment shall be for not
fewer than 60 days" following "misdemeanor"
in the first sentence and deleted "any imprisonment in the county jail shall be for not more
than one year" at the end of the second sentence; in Subsection (6)(b) deleted "41-6-44 or";
in Subsection (7)(a) substituted "41-6-43(1)" for
"41-6-43(b)"; in Subsection (9) substituted
"41-2-130" for "41-2-19.6"; and made minor
changes in phraseology and punctuation
throughout the section.
This section was set out in 1987 as reconciled
by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel.
The 1987 (1st S.S.) amendment, effective
June 5, 1987, substituted "concentration of .08
grams or greater as shown by a chemical test"
for "content of .08% or greater by weight as
shown by a chemical test" in Subsection (1) (a),
substituted the provisions of Subsection (2) for
the former provisions which read "Percent by
weight of alcohol in the blood shall be based
upon grams of alcohol per one hundred cubic
centimeters of blood, and the percent by weight
of alcohol in the breath shall be based upon
grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath", and
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76-2-302. Compulsion.—(1) A person is not guilty of an offense when
he engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was coerced to do so by
the use or threatened imminent use of unlawful physical force upon him
or a third person, which force or threatened force a person of reasonable
firmness in his situation would not have resisted.
(2) The defense of compulsion provided by this section shall be unavailable to a person who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly places
himself in a situation in which it is probable that he will be subjected to
duress.
(3) A married woman is not entitled, by reason of the presence of her
husband, to any presumption of compulsion or to any defense of compulsion except as in subsection (1) provided.
History: C. 1953, 76-2-302, enacted by
L. 1973, cb. 196, § 78-2-302.

Collateral Eeferences.
Criminal Law<§=>38.
22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 44.
21 Am. Jur. 2d 180, Criminal Law §§ 100,
101.

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Coercion.
Where wife was asked by imprisoned
Where defendant was charged with es- husband to break into jail and get the
cape from state prison, trial court did not keys and unlock the doors, but instead
err in refusing to submit to jury asserted gave him hacksaw blades, she was not
defense of coercion where defendant ad- incapable of commission of crime because
mitted his escape but claimed he did so she departed from his coercion and combecause of trouble with the prison inmates mitted a crime of her own choosing,
caused by his failure to pay for broken Farrell v. Turner, 25 U. (2d) 351, 482 P.
radio. State v. Pearson, 15 U. (2d) 353, 2d 117.
393 P. 2d 390.

76-2-303. Entrapment.—(1) It is a defense that the actor was entrapped into committing the offense. Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer or a person directed by or acting in co-operation with the
officer induces the commission of an offense in order to obtain evidence of
the commission for prosecution by methods creating a substantial risk that
the offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it.
Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to commit an offense
does not constitute entrapment.
(2) The defense of entrapment shall be unavailable when causing or
threatening bodily injury is an element of the offense charged and the
prosecution is based on conduct causing or threatening the injury to a
person other than the person perpetrating the entrapment.
(3) The defense provided by this section is available even though the
actor denies commission of the conduct charged to constitute the offense.
(4) Upon written motion of the defendant, the court shall hear evidence on the issue and shall determine as a matter of fact and law whether
the defendant was entrapped to commit the offense. Defendant's motion
shall be made at least ten days before trial except the court for good cause
shown may permit a, later filing.
(5) Should the court determine that the defendant was entrapped, it
shall dismiss the case with prejudice, but if the court determines the de36
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76-2-308. Affirmative defenses.—Defenses enumerated in this part constitute affirmative defenses.
History: 0. 1953, 76-2-308, enacted by
L. 1973, en. 196, § 76-2-308.

CoUateral Eeferences.
Criminal Law<§=3330.
22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 573.
21 Am. Jur. 2d 204, Criminal Law § 135.

Part 4
Justification Excluding Criminal Responsibility
76-2-401. Justification as defense—When allowed.—Conduct which is
justified is a defense to prosecution for any offense based on the conduct.
The defense of justification may be claimed:
(1) When the actor's conduct is in defense of persons or property
under the circumstances described in sections 76-2-402 through 76-2-406 of
this part;
(2) When the actor's conduct is reasonable and in fulfillment of his
duties as a governmental officer or employee;
(3) When the actor's conduct is reasonable discipline of minors by
parents, guardians, teachers, or other persons in loco parentis;
(4) When the actor's conduct is reasonable discipline of persons in
custody under the laws of the state;
(5) When the actor's conduct is justified for any other reason under
the laws of this state.
History: C. 1953* 76-2-401, enacted by
L. 1973, cn. 196, § 76-2-401.

his office, or place of business or employment, 41 A. L. R. 3d 584.
Homicide: duty to retreat where assailCross-References.
ant and assailed share the same living
Burden of proving homicide justified, quarters, 26 A. L. R. 3d 1296.
77-31-12.
Homicide: modern status of rules as to
burden and quantum of proof to show
CoUateral References.
self-defense, 43 A. L. R. 3d 221.
Criminal Law<^38.
f Homicide or assault in defense of habitat
22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 49.
i ° n or property, 34 A. L. R. 1488.
40 Am. Jur. 2d 405, Homicide § 110.
, ^ u ? t m t *£*? f 0 ^ '
* o m l c l d o a a af*
1
a
f ected by, 25 A. L. R. 1007.
".
Relationship with assailant's wife as
Admissibility on issue of self-defense
provocation depriving defendant of right
(or defense of another), on prosecution 0 f self-defense, 9 A. L. R. 3d 933.
for homicide or assault, of evidence of
Self-defense by one who has rightfully
specific acts of violence by deceased, or entered on premises of his assailant, 53
person assaulted, against others than de- A. L. R. 486.
fendant, 121 A. L. R. 380.
Self-defense, right of, as affected by
Duty to retreat to wall as affected by defendant's violation of law only casually
illegal character of premises on which related to the encounter, 10 A. L" R. 861.
homicide occurs, 2 A. L. R. 518.
Wife's confession of adultery as affectHomicide: duty to retreat as condition ing degree of homicide in killing her paraof self-defense when one is attacked at mour, 10 A. L. R. 470.
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Combat.
attack on innocent victim. State v. JohnCombat, within meaning of former ex- son > 1 1 2 u - 130> 1 8 5 P. 2d 738.
cusable homicide statute, required actual
Guiding principle in determining whether
participation by both deceased and de- homicide was committed by accident and
fendant, and did not include one-sided misfortune in heat of passion and upon
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History: C. 1953, 76-3-404, enacted by
24B C.J.S. Criminal Law §1983(2)b
L. 1973, clL 196, § 76-3-404.
(a).
21 Am. Jur. 2d 547, Criminal Law § 584.
Collateral References,
J&^^lSHL.0'

Crixniaal L a w ^ l 2 0 8 ( 2 ) .

**

76-3-405. Limitation on sentence where conviction or prior sentence
set aside.—Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside on direct
review or on collateral attack, the court shall not impose a new sentence
for the same offense or for a different offense based on the same conduct
which is more severe than the prior sentence less the portion of the prior
sentence previously satisfied.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-405, enacted by
22 C.J.S. Criminal Law §403(9).
Lc 1973, cb. 196, § 76-3-405.
« « * i T> *
Propriety of increased punishment on
Collateral Eeferences.
n e w t r i a l f o r B a m e o f f e n s e j 1 2 A . L. E. 3d
Criminal Law<&»260(13).
978.

CHAPTEB 4
INCHOATE OFFENSES
Part 1. Attempt
Section
76-4-101. Attempt—Elements of offense.
76-4-102. Attempt—Classification of offenses.
Part 2. Criminal Conspiracy
76-4-201. Conspiracy—Elements of offense.
76-4-202. Conspiracy—Classification of offenses.
Part 3. Exemptions and Eestrictions
76-4-301. Specific attempt or conspiracy offense prevails.
76-4-302. Conviction of inchoate and principal offense or attempt and conspiracy to
commit offense prohibited.

Part 1
Attempt
76-4-101. Attempt—Elements of offense.—(1) For purposes of this
part a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the
kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the offense,
he engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward commission
of the offense.
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not constitute a substantial
step unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit
the offense.
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt shall arise:
(a) Because the offense attempted was actually committed; or
(b) Due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been
committed had the attendant circumstances been as the actor believed them
to be.
62
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78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs
and to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of adjudicative proceedings of
agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local agencies;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims
department of a circuit court;
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(f) appeals from district court in criminal cases, except those involving
a conviction of a first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs involving a
criminal conviction, except those involving a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including but not limited to divorce, annulment, property division, child
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals, upon its own motion only and by the vote of four
judges of the court, may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has
original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Chapter
46b, Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304; 1988,
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, ch.
248, § 8.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment by Laws 1988, Chapter 73, effective April
25, 1988, inserted subsection designations (a)
and (b) in Subsection (1); inserted "resulting
from formal adjudicative proceedings" in Subsection (2)(a); substituted "state agencies" for
"state and local agencies" in Subsection (2)(a);
substituted "informal adjudicative proceedings
of the agencies" for "them" in Subsection (2)(a);
deleted "notwithstanding any other provision
of law" at the end of Subsection (2)(a); inserted
Subsection (b); redesignated former Subsections (2)(b) to (2)(h) as Subsections (2)(c) to
(2)(i); added "except those from the small
claims department of a circuit court" at the end

of Subsection (2)(d); and made minor stylistic
changes.
The 1988 amendment by Laws 1988, Chapter 210, effective April 25, 1988, added Subsection (2)(h) and redesignated former Subsection
(2)(h) as Subsection (2)(i).
The 1988 amendment by Laws 1988, Chapter 248, effective April 25, 1988, in Subsection
(2)(a), rewrote the phrase before "except"
which had read "the final orders and decrees of
state and local agencies or appeals from the
district court review of them"; deleted "notwithstanding any other provision of law" at the
end of Subsection (2)(a); inserted present Subsection (2Kb); designated former Subsections
(2Kb) to (2)(h) as Subsections (2)(c) to (2)(i); and
substituted "first degree or capital felony" for
"first or capital degree felony" in present Subsection (2)(0.
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78-4-5. Jurisdiction — Exclusive and concurrent.
(1) Circuit courts shall have jurisdiction over all classes of misdemeanors
and infractions involving persons 18 years of age and older and shall have the
power to impose the punishments prescribed for these offenses. The judge of
the circuit court shall have and exercise the powers and jurisdiction of a
magistrate, including proceedings for the preliminary examination to determine probable cause, commitment prior to trial, or the release on bail of
persons charged with criminal offenses. Whenever a complaint may be commenced before a magistrate under § 77-57-2 or an arrested person is to be
taken before a magistrate under § 77-13-17, the complaint may be commenced or the arrested person may be taken before any circuit court judge in
the county or the justice of the peace in the county in whose precinct the
offense occurred, unless both are unavailable, and then before any justice of
the peace having jurisdiction. All complaints for offenses charged under Title
41, except for offenses charged under Article 5 of Chapter 6 of Title 41, must
be filed in the court of the municipal justice of the peace or the precinct of the
county justice of the peace where the offense occurred where such justice
courts exist and have jurisdiction of such offenses.
(2) The circuit court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of all cases
arising under or by reason of the violation of any county ordinance involving
persons 18 years of age or older, unless the office of precinct justice of the
peace exists in the county, in which case jurisdiction shall be concurrent.
(3) The circuit court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of all cases
arising under or by reason of the violation of any municipal ordinance involving persons 18 years of age and over in those municipalities in which a municipal department of the circuit court exists or has been created.
(4) The circuit court shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the juvenile
court over all traffic offenses committed by persons less than 18 years of age.
History: C. 1953, 78-4-5, enacted by L.
1977, chc 77, § 1.
Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1977,
ch. 77, § 1 repealed former § 78-4-5 (L. 1951,
ch. 26, § 2(2); C. 1943, Supp., 104-4-3.11), relating to prohibition of political activity, and
enacted present § 78-4-5, effective July 1,
1978.
Compiler's Notes. — Sections 77-57-2 and
77-13-17, referred to the third sentence in Sub-

section (1), were repealed by Laws 1980, cb. 15,
§ 1. For present provisions, see §§ 77-25-1 et
seq. and 77-7-1 et seq.
Cross-References. — Actions for violation
of ordinances, § 10-7-65 et seq.
Justices' courts, Chapter 5 of this title.
Magistrates, § 77-7-18 et seq.
Power of cities to provide by ordinance for
treatment of alcoholics and narcotic or drug
addicts, § 10-8-47.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Complaint.
—Amendment.
—Signing and swearing.
Juvenile traffic offenders.
—Drunk driving.
Place of detention.
Misdemeanors.
—City court.
Preliminary hearings.
Presumptions.
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78-4-5. Jurisdiction — Exclusive and concurrent — Taking
of juvenile licenses.
(1) (a) Circuit courts have jurisdiction over all classes of misdemeanors and
infractions involving persons 18 years of age and older and may impose the
punishments prescribed for these offenses. The judge of the circuit court has
the authority and jurisdiction of a magistrate including the conducting oi
proceedings for the preliminary examination to determine probable cause,
commitment prior to trial, or the release on bail of persons charged with
criminal offenses.
(b) When a complaint may be commenced before a magistrate under
Section 77-3-1 or an arrested person is to be taken before a magistrate
under Section 77-7-18, the complaint may be commenced or the arrested
person may be taken before any circuit court judge in the county or the
justice court judge in the county in whose precinct the offense occurred,
unless both are unavailable; then before any justice court judge having
jurisdiction.
(c) All complaints for offenses charged under Title 41 except offenses
charged under Article 5, Chapter 6, Title 41, shall be filed in the municipal
justice court or the county justice court where the offense occurred if those
justice courts exist and have jurisdiction of the offenses.
(2) The circuit court has exclusive original jurisdiction of all cases arising
under or by reason of the violation of any county ordinance involving persons 18
years of age or older, but if a county justice court exists in the county, jurisdiction is concurrent.
(3) (a) The circuit court has exclusive original jurisdiction of all cases arising
under or by reason of the violation of any municipal ordinance involving
persons 18 years of age and older in those municipalities in which a municipal department of the circuit court exists or has been created.
(b) The circuit court has concurrent jurisdiction with county justice
courts over violations of municipal ordinances charging persons 18 years of
age and older with driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, driving
with a blood alcohol content of .08% or higher, or reckless driving in
municipalities within a county precinct in which a municipal justice court
does not exist.
(c) The circuit court has concurrent jurisdiction with municipal justice
courts over violations of state statutes in municipalities where a municipal
justice court exists.
(4) The circuit court has jurisdiction over all traffic offenses committed by
persons younger than 18 years of age, except those offenses exclusive to the
juvenile court under Subsection 78-3a-16(l)(a). The circuit court shall notify the
juvenile court of a conviction of any person younger than 18 years of age of an
offense under Section 78-3a-39.5.
(5) The circuit court has authority to take the juvenile's driver license and
return it to the Driver License Division, Department of Public Safety, for
suspension under Section 41-2-128.
History: C. 1953, 78-4-5, enacted by L.
1977, ch. 77, § 1; 1988, ch. 248, § 29; 1989, ch.
150, § 5; 1989, ch. 157, § 9; 1989, ch. 188, § 8.

Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, divided Subsection (1) into subsections; substituted "Section
77-3-1" and "Section 77-7-18" for "Section
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(3) in actions under the Utah Uniform Probate Code;
(4) in actions to review the decisions of any state administrative
agency, board, council, commission, or hearing officer;
(5) in actions seeking remedies in the form of extraordinary writs; and
(6) in all other actions where, by statute, jurisdiction is exclusively
vested in the district court or other trial or appellate court.
History: C. 1953, 78-4-7, enacted by L.
1977, ch. 77, § 1; 1983, ch. 76, § 1; 1986, ch.
121, § 1; 1988, ch. 248, § 31.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, deleted Subsection designation (1) at the beginning of the section; substituted the subsection designations

(1) to (6) for former subsection designations
(l)(a) to (l)(f); deleted former Subsection (2)
which read "The circuit court shall have concurrent jurisdiction with justices of the peace
courts where the sum claimed is less than
$750"; and made minor stylistic changes.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Title to real estate.
An order of the circuit court purporting to
adjudicate ownership rights to real property
and the proceeds of its sale was null and void.
A circuit court could not, through consent or

waiver, expand its jurisdiction to adjudicate
claims involving the title to real property.
Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987).

78-4-7.5. Trials de novo.
The circuit court has appellate jurisdiction to hear trials de novo of the
judgments of the justices' courts and trials de novo of the small claims department of the circuit court.
History: C. 1953, 78-4-7.5, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 47, § 66; 1988, ch. 73, § 2; 1988, ch.
248, § 32.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment by Laws 1988, Chapter 73, effective April
25, 1988, rewrote the section which read "The
circuit court has jurisdiction to hear trials de

novo of the judgments of the justices' courts."
The 1988 amendment by Laws 1988, Chapter 248, effective April 25, 1988, inserted "appellate" before "jurisdiction."
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.

78-4-8. Venue and change of judge provisions — Exceptions.
Provisions of law regarding venue and change of judge apply to the circuit
courts the same as district courts, except cases arising under or by reason of
the violation of municipal ordinances may, upon stipulation of the parties or
upon order of the court for good cause shown, be tried and decided in a municipality or county within the circuit other than the municipality or county in
which the violation occurred.
History: C. 1953, 78-4-8, enacted by L.
1977, ch. 77, § 1; 1983, ch. 76, § 2; 1988, ch.
248, § 33.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, deleted the for-

mer first sentence which read "In criminal and
civil cases the territorial jurisdiction of circuit
courts shall be statewide" and made minor stylistic changes.
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CIRCUIT COURTS
History: C. 1953, 78-4-10, enacted by L.
1977, ch. 77, § 1; L. 1983, ch. 76, § 4; 1986,
ch. 47, § 67.
Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1977,
ch. 77, § 1 repealed former § 78-4-10 (L. 1951,
ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Supp., 104-4-7), relating to
residence of city court judges and place of holding court, and enacted present § 78-4-10, effective July 1, 1978.
Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amend-

78-4-11

ment increased the number of judges from 11
to 14 in the fifth circuit and from four to five in
the eighth circuit; and added the last sentence.
The 1986 amendment deleted the former last
sentence, which read: 'The governor shall appoint three judges for the fifth circuit and one
judge for the eighth circuit effective July 1,
1983, to hold office until their successors are
duly elected and qualified at the general election in 1986,"

78-4-11. Appeal to Court of Appeals — County attorneys
to represent state, city attorneys to represent municipalities.
Except as otherwise directed by § 78-2-2, appeals from final civil and criminal judgments of the circuit courts are to the Court of Appeals. The county
attorney shall represent the interests of the state as public prosecutor in any
criminal appeals from the circuit court. City attorneys shall represent the
interests of municipalities in any appeals from circuit courts involving violations of municipal ordinances.
History: C. 1953, 78-4-11, enacted by L.
1977, ch. 77, § 1; L. 1981, ch. 90, § 8; 1983,
ch. 76, § 5; 1986, ch. 47, § 68.
Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1977,
ch. 77, § 1 repealed former § 78-4-11 (L. 1951,
ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Supp., 104-4-8), relating to
absence of city court judge and filling vacancy,
J

and enacted present § 78-4-11, effective July 1,
1978.
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amendment rewrote this section,
Cross-References. — Appellate jurisdiction U t a h Const
'
- Art. V1H, Sec- ^ § 78 " 3 - 4 £ l t v attorney, § 10-3-928.

J

County attorney, Chapter 18 of Title 17.
NOTES TO DECISIONS

ANALYSIS

Criminal cases.
—Finality of appellate judgment.
—Right to appeal.
Guilty plea.
Effect of appeal.
—Amendment of pleadings.
Effect of satisfaction of judgment pending appeal.
Jurisdiction of appellate court.
—Amount in controversy.
—Derivative nature.
Perfection of appeal.
—Bond.
Prerequisites.
—Bonds.
Rehearing by appellate court.
—Time to take further appeal.
Scope of review.
—Supreme Court.
Trial de novo.
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JUDICIAL CODE
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am Jur 2d Justices of
the Peace § 58
C.J.S. — 51 C J S Justices of the Peace
§ 67.

Key Numbers. — Justices of the Peace «=>
79

78-5-4. Concurrent criminal jurisdiction.
Justices' courts have concurrent jurisdiction of the following public offenses
committed within the respective counties in which such courts are established:
(1) all class B and class C misdemeanors punishable by a fine no
greater than the maximum fine for a class B or C misdemeanor under
§ 76-3-301, or by imprisonment m the county jail or municipal prison not
exceeding six months, or by both the fine and imprisonment; and
(2) all infractions and the punishments prescribed for them.
History: C. 1953, 78-5-4, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 127, § 5; 1986, ch. 178, § 65.
Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1979,
ch 127, § 5 repealed former § 78-5-4 (L 1951,
ch 58, § 1, C 1943, Supp, 104-5-4, L 1975
(1st S S.), ch. 4, § 1, 1977, ch. 78, § 12), relating to criminal jurisdiction of justices' courts,
and enacted present § 78-5-4
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amendment, in Subsection (1), substituted "no

greater than the maximum fine for a class B or
C misdemeanor under § 76-3-301" for "less
than $300" and "the" for "such" preceding "fine
and imprisonment"
Cross-References. — Abuse of process a
misdemeanor, § 76-8-601
Institutions of higher learning, violation of
regulations, § 53-45-9
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201,
76-3-204, 76-3-301

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality
Failure to pay fine
Nonindictable misdemeanor
—Waiver of venue
Preliminary hearing
—Felony
Representation of state
Violation of game laws
Violation of Sunday laws
Constitutionality.
Laws 1925, ch 62, amending former
§ 20-5-4 (Code 1943) and limiting jurisdiction
of justices' courts to offenses committed in their
respective precincts, was not invalid because it
might produce confusion and derangement in
criminal practice and procedure in justices'
courts and was inconsistent with other statutory provisions Dillard v Distnct Court, 69
Utah 10, 251 P 1070 (1926)
Failure to pay fine.
After justice of peace sentenced defendant to
jail for petit larceny, and to pay fine, he was
without authority to adjudge that defendant be

further imprisoned in default of payment of
fine imposed In re Lewis, 10 Utah 47, 41 P
1077 (1894)
Nonindictable misdemeanor.
—Waiver of venue.
Although complaint charging the injuring of
a cow by altering or defacing brand should
have been filed in justices' court instead of in
district court, since action was for
nonindictable misdemeanor, question of venue
was not raised by motion in arrest of judgment
based on failure of jurisdiction, as district court
had cognizance of subject of misdemeanors,
and as question of venue was not raised, it was
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JUDICIAL CODE

78-5-13. Judgment not a lien unless so docketed.
A judgment rendered in a justices' court creates no lien upon any lands of
the judgment debtor, unless such an abstract is filed and docketed in the office
of the clerk of the district court of the county in which the lands are situated;
and when so filed and docketed such judgment is a lien upon the real property
of the judgment debtor, not exempt from execution, situated in that county,
for the period of eight years from the date the judgment was entered, unless
the judgment is previously satisfied.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-5-13.
Cross-References. — Lien of judgments of
distnct courts, § 78-22-1.

Limitation of action on judgment,
§ 78-12-22
Satisfaction of judgments in district courts,
Rule 58B, U R C P

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Priority of liens.
Where judgment rendered by justice of peace
became hen upon land by being duly docketed
in district court, but before it was enforced by
levy and sale, mortgage hen also accrued and
thereafter time limited by statute for hen of

such judgment was allowed to expire, and judgment was then renewed, hen of first judgment
expired, mortgage hen attached as first hen,
and sale on second judgment could not affect
such mortgage hen Smith v Schwartz, 21
Utah 126, 60 P 305, 81 Am St R 670 (1899)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Justices of
the Peace § 93
C.J.S. — 51 C J.S. Justices of the Peace
§ 123(7)

Key Numbers. — Justices of the Peace «=»
131, 138(10)

78-5-14. Trial de novo in circuit court.
Any person dissatisfied with a judgment rendered in a justices' court,
whether the same was rendered on default or after trial, is entitled to a trial
de novo in the circuit court of the county as provided by law.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-5-14; 1986, ch. 47, § 74.
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amendment substituted "is entitled to a trial de novo
with the circuit court of the county as provided
by law" for "may apply for a new trial or ap-

peal therefrom to the district court of the
county within the time and in the manner provided by law"
Cross-References. — Fee of county clerk on
appeal to district court, § 21-2-2
Jurisdiction of circuit court, § 78-4-7 5

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Appealable judgments
-—Finality
Jurisdiction of appellate court
—Amount in controversy
—Lack of jurisdiction of justices
Effect
—Waiver of objections
Consenting that case be set for trial
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78-31a-20. Scope of chapter.
This chapter is not intended to provide a means of arbitration exclusive of
those sanctioned under common law.
History: C. 1953, 78-31a-20, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 225, § 1.

CHAPTER 32
CONTEMPT
Section
78-32-1.
78-32-2.
78-32-3.
78-32-4.
78-32-5.
78-32-6.
78-32-7.
78-32-8.

Acts and omissions constituting
contempt.
Re-entry after eviction from real
property.
In immediate presence of court;
summary action — Without immediate presence; procedure.
Warrant of attachment or commitment order to show cause.
Bail.
Duty of sheriff.
Bail bond — Form.
Officer's return.

Section
78-32-9.
78-32-10.
78-32-11.
78-32-12.
78-32-13.
78-32-14.
78-32-15.
78-32-16.

Hearing.
Judgment.
Damages to party aggrieved.
Imprisonment to compel performance.
Procedure when party charged fails
to appear.
Excuse for nonappearance — Unnecessary restraint forbidden.
Contempt of process of nonjudicial
officer.
Procedure.

78-32-1. Acts and omissions constituting contempt.
The following acts or omissions in respect to a court or proceedings therein
are contempts of the authority of the court:
(1) Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior toward the judge
while holding the court, tending to interrupt the due course of a trial or
other judicial proceeding.
(2) Breach of the peace, boisterous conduct or violent disturbance, tending to interrupt the due course of a trial or other judicial proceeding.
(3) Misbehavior in office, or other willful neglect or violation of duty by
an attorney, counsel, clerk, sheriff, or other person appointed or elected to
perform a judicial or ministerial service.
(4) Deceit, or abuse of the process or proceedings of the court, by a
party to an action or special proceeding.
(5) Disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or process of the court.
(6) Assuming to be an officer, attorney or counselor of a court, and
acting as such without authority.
(7) Rescuing any person or property in the custody of an officer by
virtue of an order or process of such court.
(8) Unlawfully detaining a witness or party to an action while going to,
remaining at, or returning from, the court where the action is on the
calendar for trial.
(9) Any other unlawful interference with the process or proceedings of
a court.
(10) Disobedience of a subpoena duly served, or refusing to be sworn or
to answer as a witness.
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78-32-1

(11) When summoned as a juror in a court, neglecting to attend or
serve as such, or improperly conversing with a party to an action to be
tried at such court, or with any other person, concerning the merits of
such action, or receiving a communication from a party or other person in
respect to it, without immediately disclosing the same to the court.
(12) Disobedience by an inferior tribunal, magistrate or officer of the
lawful judgment, order or process of a superior court, or proceeding in an
action or special proceeding contrary to law, after such action or special
proceeding is removed from the jurisdiction of such inferior tribunal,
magistrate or officer. Disobedience of the lawful orders or process of a
judicial officer is also a contempt of the authority of such officer.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-32-1.
Cross-References. — Abuse of office,
§ 76-8-201 et seq
Criminal Code not to affect contempt power,
§§ 76-1-107, 76-3-201
Defense costs in criminal actions, contempt
based on failure of convicted defendant to pay,
§§ 77-32a-7 to 77-32a-12
Discovery, sanctions for noncompliance with
order compelling discovery, Rule 37(b)(D),
U.R.C P
Execution sale bidder, refusal to pay sum
bid, Rule 69(e)(4), U R.C P
Judgment directing performance of specific
act, Rule 70, U R C P

Juvenile courts, §§ 78-3a-28, 78-3a-52
Labor disputes, §§ 34-19-9, 34-19-10
Masters, refusal of witness to appear or give
evidence before, Rule 53(d)(2), U R C P
Penalties for failure to appear or complete
jury service, § 76-46-20
Power of judicial officers to punish for contempt, § 78-7-18
Practice of law without a license, § 78-51-25
Repeated application for orders as contempt,
§ 78-7-20
Subpoena, refusal to obey, Rule 45(f),
URCP
Summary judgment affidavits made in bad
faith, Rule 56(g), U R C P

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Ability to comply
"Any other unlawful interference "
Civil or criminal nature of proceedings.
Criticism or comments
Deceit or abuse of process
Disobedience by inferior tribunal
Disobedience of judgment, order or process
Excuses or defenses
Findings of fact required
Independent proceeding
Inherent power of courts
Perjury
Purpose of section
Territorial courts
Ability to comply.
It is important that the ability of the party
charged with contempt to perform receive consideration before the court is justified in
awarding damages Foreman v Foreman, 111
Utah 72, 176 P2d 144 (1946)
One who puts forth every reasonable effort to
comply with court order, but is unable to do so,
is not guilty of contempt on account of such
failure Limb v Limb, 113 Utah 385, 195 P 2d
263 (1948)

Judgment finding defendant in contempt for
failure to comply with divorce decree, requiring payment of $75 per month for alimony and
support of minor children, was upheld as supported by evidence that defendant was able to
comply with that decree and that his failure to
do so was willful, even though defendant testified that he had been sick and out of employment and that, since starting work again, he
had paid divorced wife $50 a month out of
monthly salary of $180, from which he also
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Rule 4.3. Continuances — Civil.
(a) Cases set for trial shall not be continued upon stipulation of counsel
alone, but continuances may be allowed by order of the presiding judge or the
judge to whom the case is assigned for trial. No continuances shall be allowed
except for good cause shown. Said continuances may be granted upon motion
of counsel made in open court or by written motion in which the grounds
therefore are stated or by written stipulation of the parties and approval of
the court. A notice of all written motions must be served upon counsel for the
opposing side in the manner prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
and these rules. In the event that counsel seeks to have the hearing of the
same in less than five (5) days from the time of the service of the motion, an
order permitting the same and directing that the notice be served, must be
entered by the court and served upon counsel with the motion.
(b) In law and motion matters, except orders to show cause and bench
warrants, continuances may be had upon stipulation of the parties and notice
to the law and motion clerks provided, however, that once a matter has been
placed upon the typed law and motion calendar, a continuance may be had
only upon approval by the court.

Rule 4.4. Requests for instructions.
(a) Requests for instruction shall be presented to the court at the commencement of the trial, provided, that additional or further instructions may
be presented no later than the close of evidence. At the time of presenting
requests, a copy of the same shall be furnished to opposing counsel.
(b) Requests for instructions to the jury must be in writing, stating in full
the instruction requested. Requests referring only to numbers in JIFU will
not be received. Each request shall be upon a separate sheet of paper, the
original and copies of which shall be free from red lines and firm names, and
shall be entitled:
"Instruction No.

"

with the number of the request written thereon in lead pencil.
(c) If citations are given in support of a requested instruction, at least one
copy of the requested instruction furnished to the court shall be submitted
without such citation being typed thereon. Citations may be set out upon
separate sheets attached to the particular instruction to which the citation
relates.

Rule 4.5. Orders, judgments, and decrees.
(a) Contents and service. Upon entry of judgment, notice of such entry of
judgment shall be served upon the opposing party and proof of such service
shall be filed with the court. All orders, judgments, and decrees shall be so
drawn as to show that the same were made and entered upon the stipulation
of counsel or the motion of an attorney of record in the cause or proceeding in
which the same is made, and shall give the name of the attorney making such
motion, or that the same was ordered by the court on its own initiative.
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Rule 16

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Child Sexual Abuse
Cases, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 443.
Victims Have Rights Too, 1986 Utah L. Rev.
449Note, Videotaping the Testimony of an
Abused Child: Necessary Protection for the

Child or Unwarranted Compromise of the Defendant's Constitutional Rights?, 1986 Utah L.
Rev. 461.
A.L.R. — Closed-circuit television witness
examination, 61 A.L.R.4th 1155.

Rule 16. Discovery.
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the defense upon request the following material or information of which he has
knowledge:
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefendants;
(2) the criminal record of the defendant;
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant;
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of
the accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of
the offense for reduced punishment; and
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good
cause shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the
defendant to adequately prepare his defense.
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable following the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The
prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure.
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose
to the prosecutor such information as required by statute relating to alibi or
insanity and any other item of evidence which the court determines on good
cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in order for the
prosecutor to adequately prepare his case.
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall make all disclosures at least ten days before trial or as soon as practicable. He has a continuing duty to make disclosure.
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may
make disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and information may be inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable times and
places.
(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that discovery or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, or make such other order
as is appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court may permit the party to
make such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to
be inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief
following such an ex parte showing, the entire text of the party's statement
shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made available
to the appellate court in the event of an appeal.
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the
attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the
court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a
continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or
it may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.
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(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the accused may be required to:
(1) appear in a lineup;
(2) speak for identification;
(3) submit to fingerprinting or the making of other bodily impressions;
(4) pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the crime;
(5) try on articles of clothing or other items of disguise;
(6) permit the taking of samples of blood, hair, fingernail scrapings,
and other bodily materials which can be obtained without unreasonable
intrusion;
(7) provide specimens of handwriting;
(8) submit to reasonable physical or medical inspection of his body; and
(9) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance at the
time of the alleged offense.
Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is required for the foregoing purposes, reasonable notice of the time and place of such appearance shall
be given to the accused and his counsel. Failure of the accused to appear or to
comply with the requirements of this rule, unless relieved by order of the
court, without reasonable excuse shall be grounds for revocation of pre-trial
release, may be offered as evidence in the prosecutor's case in chief for consideration along with other evidence concerning the guilt of the accused and
shall be subject to such further sanctions as the court should deem appropriate
(77-35-16, enacted by L. 1980, ch. 14, § 1.)
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Discretion of court
A trial court is allowed broad discretion in
granting or refusing discovery and inspection,
and its determinations on this subject will not
be overturned on appeal unless the court has
abused its discretion State v Knill, 656 P 2d
1026 (Utah 1982), State v Lairby, 699 P 2d
1187 (Utah 1984)

ANALYSIS

In general.
Continuing duty to disclose.
Discretion of court.
Failure to request discovery.
Nondisclosure.
—No violation of rule.
Physical evidence
—Stolen property
Required disclosure
—State.
Voluntary prosecutorial response.
Witnesses.
Cited.
In general.
Discovery powers are conferred upon both
the circuit courts and the district courts State
v Easthope, 668 P.2d 528 (Utah 1983).
Continuing duty to disclose.
Even if there is no court-ordered disclosure,
a prosecutor's failure to disclose newly discovered inculpatory information which falls
within the ambit of Subdivision (a), after the
prosecution has made a voluntary disclosure of
evidence, might so mislead a defendant as to
cause prejudicial error State v Carter, 707
P2d 656 (Utah 1985); State v Knight, 734
P 2d 913 (Utah 1987).

Failure to request discovery.
The defendant's claim that the prosecutor's
failure to provide him with a police report describing a witness' testimony prior to trial was
not entertained, no request for discovery, written or oral, being made at any time State v
Booker, 709 P 2d 342 (Utah 1985)
Nondisclosure.
—No violation of rule.
State's failure to disclose to defendant before
trial certain jail records which corroborated defendant's testimony that he requested medical
treatment while in jail did not violate defendant's discovery rights where there was no
showing in record from which it could be fairly
inferred that prosecution knew or should have
known that defendant's request for medical
treatment would ever be an issue or of any importance at trial State v Fierst, 692 P 2d 751
(Utah 1984)
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Rule 19

tion in trial of criminal case (or related hear- disclosure of prosecution information regarding) as ground of disqualification in subse- ing prospective jurors, 86 A L R 3d 571
quent cnminal case involving same defendant,
Racial or ethnic prejudice of prospective ju6 ALR3d 519
rors as proper subject of inquiry or ground of
Social or business relationship between pro- challenge on voir dire in state criminal case, 94
posed juror and nonparty witness as affecting ALR3d 15
former's qualification as juror, 11 ALR3d
Religious belief, affiliation, or prejudice of
859
prospective juror as proper subject of inquiry or
Number of peremptory challenges allowed in ground for challenge on voir dire, 95 A L R 3d
criminal case where there are two or more de- 172
fendants tried together, 21 A L R 3d 725
Excusing, on account of public, charitable, or
Prior service on grand jury which considered educational employment, one qualified and not
indictment against accused as disqualification specifically exempted as juror in state criminal
for service on petit jury, 24 A L R 3d 1236
case as ground of complaint by accused, 99
Comment note on beliefs regarding capital ALR3d 1261
punishment as disqualifying juror in capital
Additional peremptory challenges because of
case — post-Witherspoon cases, 39 A L R 3d multiple criminal charges, 5 A L R 4th 533
550
Validity and construction of statute or court
Propriety, on voir dire in criminal case, of rule prescribing number of peremptory chalinquiries as to juror's possible prejudice if in- lenges in criminal cases according to nature of
formed of defendant's prior convictions, 43 offense or extent of punishment, 8 A L R 4th
ALR3d 1081
149
Membership in racially biased or prejudiced
Cure of prejudice resulting from statement
organization as proper subject of voir dire in- by prospective juror during voir dire, in presquiry or ground for challenge, 63 A L R 3d ence of other prospective jurors, as to defen1052
dant's guilt, 50 A L R 4th 969
Similarity of occupation between proposed
Professional or business relations between
juror and alleged victim of crime as affecting proposed juror and attorney as ground for chaljuror's competency, 71 ALR3d 974
lenge for cause, 52 ALR4th 964
Law enforcement officers as qualified jurors
Fact that juror in criminal case or juror's
in criminal cases, 72 A L R 3d 895
relative or friend, has previously been victim of
Former law enforcement officers as qualified cnminal incident as ground of disqualification,
jurors in criminal cases, 72 A L R 3d 958
65 A L R 4th 743
Use of peremptory challenge to exclude from
Examination and challenge of federal case
jury persons belonging to race or class, 79 jurors on basis of attitudes toward homosexualALR3d 14
ity, 85 A L R Fed 864
Right of defense in criminal prosecution to
Key Numbers. — Jury «=» 57 et seq

Rule 19. Instructions.
(a) At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the court reasonably directs, any party may file written request that the court instruct the
jury on the law as set forth in the request At the same time copies of such
requests shall be furnished to the other parties The court shall inform counsel
of its proposed action upon the request, and it shall furnish counsel with a
copy of its proposed instructions, unless the parties stipulate that such instructions may be given orally, or otherwise waive this requirement
(b) Upon each written request so presented and given, or refused, the court
shall endorse its decision and shall initial or sign it If part be given and part
refused, the court shall distinguish, showing by the endorsement what part of
the charge was given and what part was refused
(c) No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission
therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection Notwithstanding a party's failure to object, error may be assigned to instructions
m order to avoid a manifest injustice.
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(d) The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case, and if the court
refers to any of the evidence, it shall instruct the jury that they are the
exclusive judges of all questions of fact.
(e) Arguments of the respective parties shall be made after the court has
instructed the jury. Unless otherwise provided by law, any limitation upon
time for argument shall be within the discretion of the court.
(77-35-19, enacted by L. 1980, ch. 14, § 1.)
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Failure to request or object.
—Review without objection.
Objections.
—Failure to object.
—Specificity.
—Time.
Presumptions.
Requests by jury.
Specific instructions.
—Circumstantial evidence.
—Elements of offense.
—Lesser included offenses.
—Unreliability of eyewitness identification.
—Verdict-urging instruction.
Untimely request.
Cited.
Failure to request or object.
Where a defendant does not request an instruction on a certain subject, he cannot later
claim that the trial court's failure to instruct
on that subject is error. State v. Cowan, 26
Utah 2d 410, 490 P.2d 890 (1971).
Except when necessary to avoid manifest injustice, this rule prohibits the assigning as
error the trial court's failure to give a jury instruction where no objection is made before the
jury is instructed. State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d
56 (Utah 1982).
Where oral admissions of defendant in a
criminal trial are introduced without an instruction that such evidence ought to be
viewed with caution, there is no error as long
as such an instruction has not been specifically
requested, especially in a case where the subject matter is generally covered by the instructions that are given. State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d
785 (Utah 1984).
When faced with a claim that a particular
assertion of instructional error not raised at
trial should be considered on appeal because
failure to do so would result in "manifest injustice" under Subdivision (c), the Supreme Court
will determine whether to review such a claim
of error under the same standard used to determine the presence of "plain error" under Utah
Rule of Evidence 103(d). State v. Verde, 101
Utah Adv. Rep. 37 (1989).

—Review without objection.
Notwithstanding defendant's failure to object to jury instruction on criminal trespass,
Supreme Court reviewed the instruction to
prevent manifest injustice where the instruction misstated the law of criminal trespass and
was entirely inconsistent with the statutory
definition of that offense. State v. Lesley, 672
P.2d 79 (Utah 1983).
The Supreme Court declined to review a
modified "dynamite" or Allen charge under the
manifest error exception to Subdivision (c),
where defense counsel did not remain silent
but actively represented to the court that she
had read the instruction and had no objection
to it. State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021 (Utah
(1987).
Where the defendant was not forewarned
that the trial court was about to issue a verdict-urging instruction and had no opportunity
to know of or object to the allegedly harmful
portion of the instruction until after it was
given to the jury, his failure to object to it prior
to its being given to the jury did not bar consideration of the charge on appeal, under the
manifest error exception in Subdivision (c).
State v. Lactod, 761 P.2d 23 (Utah Ct. App.
1988).
Objections.
—Failure to object.
Defense counsel knew the contents of a proposed instruction from in-chambers discussion,
knew that the instruction would be given
orally, and made no objection to either the contents of the instruction or its oral presentation
until after the verdict, but merely indicated
that the instruction was not "appropriate." The
defendant was, therefore, precluded from raising an objection on appeal. State v. Kotz, 758
P.2d 463 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
—Specificity.
A general statement to the effect that an instruction does not correctly state the law is not
a sufficient objection to the instruction for purposes of a later appeal. State v. Schoenfeld, 545
P.2d 193 (Utah 1976).
Subdivision (c) requires more than a general
exception to the instructions. It requires that
the matter excepted to and the ground therefor
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where he was held sane on August 14, 1969
and trial was initially set for January 7, 1970
and commenced on April 8,1970, after disposition of defendant's motion to dismiss made on
January 7. State v. Carlsen, 25 Utah 2d 136,
478 P.2d 326 (1970).
Magistrate's authority to dismiss.
City court judge acting as a committing magistrate upon a preliminary examination did not
have authority to dismiss criminal proceedings. Van Dam v. Morris, 571 P.2d 1325 (Utah
1977).
Offense improperly alleged.
In prosecution for rape of female under 18
years of age, where defendant was given preliminary examination on complaint charging
rape had been committed on April 1, and information charged rape on that date, but proof
showed that female was then over 18 years of
age, and state promptly introduced evidence of
prior acts of intercourse before female became
18, conviction could not be upheld since defendant was not given benefit of preliminary examination for offense for which he was convicted. State v. Hoben, 36 Utah 186, 102 P.
1000 (1909).
Reasonableness of delay.
Fact that information was not filed within 30
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days after defendant's commitment, did not entitle defendant to discharge, where good cause
for delay was shown. State v. Reynolds, 24
Utah 29, 66 P. 614 (1901).
Statutes not in conflict.
There was no conflict between statutes providing for dismissal of and bar to further prosecutions against a sole defendant for misdemeanors only and other statutes providing for
dismissal of and bar to further prosecutions,
whether felony or misdemeanor, against one of
several joint defendants for purpose of allowing
dismissed to be witness for the state. In re
Petty, 18 Utah 2d 320, 422 P.2d 659 (1967).
Subsequent prosecution.
Where district court erroneously dismissed
ordinance violation prosecution on appeal from
city court but before arraignment and trial de
novo in district court and that order of dismissal was later reversed by the Supreme Court,
subsequent prosecution of defendant in district
court for the ordinance violation was not "any
other prosecution" within the bar of this section, it was merely the same prosecution which
had never been begun de novo in the district
court and thus was not barred. Boyer v. Larson, 20 Utah 2d 121, 433 P.2d 1015 (1967).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal
Law §§ 512 to 519; 21A Am. Jur. 2d Criminal
Law §§ 859 to 875.
C.J.S. — 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 468.
A.L.R. — Construction and effect of statute
authorizing dismissal of criminal action upon
settlement of civil liability growing out of act
charged, 42 A.L.R.3d 315.
Propriety of court's dismissing indictment or

prosecution because of failure of jury to agree
after successive trials, 4 A.L.R.4th 1274.
What constitutes "manifest necessity" for
state prosecutor's dismissal of action, allowing
subsequent trial despite jeopardy's having attached, 14 A.L.R.4th 1014.
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law «=> 574,
576.

Rule 26. Appeals.
(1) An appeal is taken by filing with the clerk of the court from which the
appeal is taken a notice of appeal, stating the order or judgment appealed
from, and by serving a copy of it on the adverse party or his attorney of record.
Proof of service of the copy shall be filed with the court.
(2) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from:
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea;
(b) an order made, after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of
the defendant;
(c) an interlocutory order when, upon petition for review, the appellate
court decides that the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or
(d) any order of the court judging the defendant by reason of a mental
disease or defect incompetent to proceed further in a pending prosecution.
(3) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution from:
(a) a final judgment of dismissal;
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(b) an order arresting judgment;
(c) an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of double
jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial;
(d) a judgment of the court holding a statute or any part of it invalid;
(e) an order of the court granting a pretrial motion to suppress evidence when, upon a petition for review, the appellate court decides that
the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or
(f) an order of the court granting a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty
or no contest.
(4) (a) All appeals in criminal cases shall be taken within 30 days after the
entry of the judgment appealed from, or, if a motion for a new trial or
arrest of judgment is made, within 30 days after notice of the denial of the
motion is given to the defendant or his counsel. Proof of {jiving notice
shall be filed with the court.
(b) An appeal may not be dismissed except for a material defect in
taking it, or for failure to perfect the appeal, or upon motion of the appellant. The dismissal of the appeal affirms the judgment unless another
appeal may be, and is, timely taken.
(5) Cases appealed in which the defendant is unable to post bond shall be
given a preferred and expeditious setting in the appellate court.
(6) Appeals may be submitted on briefs. If an appellant's brief is filed, the
appeal shall be decided even though a party, upon notice of the hearing, fails
to appear for oral argument.
(7) The rules of civil procedure relating to appeals govern criminal appeals
to the appellate court, except as otherwise provided.
(8) (a) In appeals to the Supreme Court of capital cases where the sentence
of death has been imposed, appellant briefs shall be filed within 60 days
of the filing of the record on appeal. Respondent briefs shall be filed
within 60 days of receipt of the appellant brief. All issues to be raised on
appeal shall be included by each party in its appellate brief. Appellant
reply briefs shall be filed within 30 days of receipt of the respondent's
brief.
(b) One 30-day extension of the 60-day filing period may be granted to
each party, but only upon application to the Supreme Court showing
extraordinary circumstances warranting an extension.
(c) The Supreme Court shall schedule the oral arguments of the case to
be heard not more than ten days after the date of filing of the final brief.
Following oral arguments, the case shall be placed first on the Supreme
Court's calendar, for expeditious determination.
(9) After an initial appeal has been resolved, a subsequent appeal of a
capital case where the sentence of death has been imposed may not be entertained by any court, nor may a stay of execution of the sentence be granted,
when the appeal does not raise any new matter not previously resolved or
when new matter could have been raised at the previous appeal.
(10) In capital cases where the sentence of death has been imposed and the
defendant has chosen not to pursue his appeal, the case shall be automatically
reviewed by the Supreme Court within 60 days after certification by the
sentencing court of the entire record, unless the time is extended by the
Supreme Court for good cause. A case involving the sentence of death has
priority over all other cases in setting for hearing and in disposition by the
Supreme Court.
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(11) The rules of practice for the Court of Appeals and circuit courts made
by the Judicial Council and approved by the Supreme Court relating to appeals from circuit courts govern criminal as well as civil appeals.
(12) An appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals,
as is appropriate, from all final orders and judgments rendered in a district
court or juvenile court under this rule.
(13) An appeal may be taken to the circuit court from a judgment rendered
in the justice court under this rule, except:
(a) the case shall be tried anew in the circuit court. The decision of the
circuit court is final, except when the validity or constitutionality of a
statute or ordinance is raised in the justice court;
(b) within 20 days after receipt of the notice of appeal, the justice court
shall transmit to the circuit court a certified copy of the docket, the original pleadings, all notices, motions, and other papers filed in the case, and
the notice and undertaking on appeal;
(c) stay of execution and relief pending appeal are under Rule 27, Utah
Rules of Court Procedure; or
(d) all further proceedings are in the circuit court, including any process required to enforce judgment.
(77-35-26, enacted by L. 1980, ch. 14, § 1; L. 1983, ch. 51, § 1; 1987, ch. 237,
§ 1; 1989, ch. 65, § 3.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amendment substituted "Rule 27" for "Rule 30" in
Subsection (k)(3).
The 1987 amendment rewrote this section,
which formerly read as amended by Laws
1983, ch. 51, § 1.
The 1989 amendment, effective April 24,
1989, added "whether by verdict or plea" to the
end of Subsection (2)(a); deleted "or" from the
end of Subsection (3)(d), added "or" to the end
of Subsection (3)(e), and added Subsection
(3)(f); substituted "may" for "can" in the second
sentence of Subsection (4Kb); divided Subsections (6) and (13)(a) into two sentences by deleting "and"; divided Subsection (8) into Subsections (8)(a) through (8)(c); substituted
"made" for "promulgated" in Subsection (11);
added "Utah Rules of Court Procedure; or" to
the end of Subsection (13)(c); and made minor
stylistic changes throughout the rule.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule governs appeals from district, circuit, and juvenile courts.
The practice and procedure for taking such appeals, including the time in which the appeal is
filed, is prescribed by the Rules of the Utah

Supreme Court and the Rules of the Utah
Court of Appeals.
The reference in Subsection (13)(c) to the
"Utah Rules of Court Procedure" is apparently
intended as a reference to the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Cross-References. — Appeals from circuit
court to district court, § 78-4-11.
Appeals from justice's court to district court,
§ 78-5-14.
Appellate jurisdiction of district courts, Utah
Const., Art. VHI, Sec. 5; § 78-3-4.
Appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court,
Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 3; § 78-2-2.
Applicability of Rules of the Utah Supreme
Court, Rule 1, R. Utah S. Ct.
Dismissal if affidavit of impecuniosity is
untrue, § 21-7-7.
A Judicial Council, Utah Const., Art. VIII,
Sec. 12.
Right of defendant to appeal, Utah Const.,
Art. I, Sec. 12; § 77-1-6.
Right of indigent accused to counsel on appeal, § 77-32-1 et seq.
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cretion in refusing to allow a change of venue
State v Smith, 11 Utah 2d 287, 358 P 2d 342
(1961)
A bare allegation of prejudice in the county
is patently inadequate to justify a change of
venue. State v Wood, 648 P 2d 71 (2d case)
(Utah), cert denied, 459 U S 988, 103 S Ct
341, 74 L Ed 2d 383 (1982)
Defendant failed in his burden of proving
that a fair and impartial trial could not be had
in the county where the action was tried, and
was therefore not entitled to a change of venue,
where his motion for a change of venue was
supported only by his counsel's affidavit to
which was attached a single newspaper article
reporting the victim's father's gratitude for the
manner in which victim's family had been
taken care of by local authorities, and which
reported a short and accurate account of a few
of the basic facts of crime, including the names
of the two persons who had been charged, such
supporting evidence was a mere allegation of
prejudice in the county and was not adequate
to justify a change of venue State v Wood, 648
P2d 71 (2d case), cert denied, 459 U S 988,
103 S Ct 341, 74 L Ed 2d 383 (1982)
Motion for a change of venue and the documents supporting the motion failed to show
that the community atmosphere was sufficiently inflammatory that the jurors' assurances of impartiality should have been disre-
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garded, even though some of the jurors had expressed an opinion that defendant was guilty
State v Lafferty, 749 P 2d 1239 (Utah 1988)
Defendant was not entitled to a change of
venue where pretrial publicity and community
sentiment was not so prejudicial as to lead inevitably to an unfair trial, to prevail on appeal,
defendant must demonstrate that the trial was
not fundamentally fair State v Bishop, 753
P 2d 439 (Utah 1988)
Factors to be considered in determining the
potential for prejudice from pretrial publicity
include (1) the standing of the victim and the
accused in the community, (2) the size of the
community, (3) the nature and gravity of the
offense, and (4) the nature and extent of publicity State v James, 99 Utah Adv Rep 14
(1989)
Disqualification of judge.
A judge should recuse himself where there is
a colorable claim of bias or prejudice, even under such circumstances, however, absent a
showing of actual bias or an abuse of discretion, failure to recuse does not constitute reversible error as long as the requirements of
this rule are met State v Neeley, 748 P 2d
1091 (Utah 1988)
A judge who has had previous contact with a
defendant on a totally unrelated matter is not
per se disqualified State v Neeley, 748 P 2d
1091 (Utah 1988)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am Jur 2d Criminal
Law § 372 et seq
C.J.S. — 22 C J S Criminal Law §§ 186 to
222.
A.L.R. — Pretrial publicity in criminal case
as ground for change of venue, 33 A L R 3d 17
Change of venue by state in criminal case,
46 A L R 3d 295

Adequacy of defense counsel's representation
of criminal client regarding venue and recusation matters, 7 A L R 4th 942
Disqualification of judge because of political
association or relation to attorney in case, 65
A L R 4th 73
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law <s» 115 to
145

Rule 30. Errors and defects,
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded
(b) Clerical mistakes m judgments, orders or other parts of the record and
errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by
the court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court may order.
(77-35-30, enacted by L. 1980, ch. 14, § 1)
Cross-References. — Arraignment, necessity of objection to preserve error, § 77-35-10

Indictments and informations,
errors, § 77-35-4
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Gun control laws, validity and construction of, 28 A. L. R. 3d 845.
Law Reviews.
The Constitutional Right to Keep and

Bear Arms, Lucilius A. Emery, 28 Harv.
L. Rev. 473.
Restrictions on the Right To Bear Arms
—State and Federal Firearms Legislation,
98 U. Pa. L. Rev. 905.

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law.
Comparable Provision.
Montana Const., Art. I l l , § 27.
Cross-Reference.
Eminent domain generally, 78-34-1 et
seq.
In general.
"Due process of law" comes to us from
the Great Charter and is synonymous with
"law of the land." It means that a party
shall have his day in court—trial. Jensen
v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 6 U. 253, 21 P. 994,
4 L. R. A. 724.
Due process of law is not necessarily
judicial process. People v. Hasbrouck, 11
U. 291, 39 P. 918.
Judgment against defendant, not served
with process and not appearing either in
person or by attorney, would not be due
process of law. Blyth & Fargo Co. v.
Swenson, 15 U. 345, 49 P. 1027.
It is elementary that there can be no
judicial action affecting vested rights that
is not based upon some process or notice
whereby the interested parties are brought
within the jurisdiction of the judicial
tribunal about to render judgment. Parry
v. Bonneville Irr. Dist., 71 U. 202, 263 P.
751.
"Due process of law" requires that, before one can be bound by a judgment
affecting his property rights, some process
must be served upon him which in some
degree at least is calculated to give him
notice. Naisbitt v. Herrick, 76 U. 575,
290 P. 950.
Due process of law requires that notice
be given to the persons whose rights are
to be affected. It hears before it condemns, proceeds upon inquiry, and renders
judgment only after trial. Biggins v. District Court of Salt Lake County, 89 U.
183, 51 P. 2d 645.
The phrase "due process of law" apparently originated with Lord Coke, who denned the terms. Many attempts have been
made to further define due process of law,
but all of them resolve into the thought
that a party shall have his day in court.
Christiansen v. Harris, 109 U. 1, 163 P.
2d 314.
In depriving a person of life or liberty, the essentials of due process are:
(a) the existence of a competent person,

body, or agency authorized by law to determine the questions; (b) an inquiry
into the merits of the question by such
person, body or agency; (c) notice to the
person of the inauguration and purpose
of the inquiry and the time at which
such person should appear if he wishes
to be heard; (d) right to appear in person or by counsel; (e) fair opportunity
to submit evidence, examine and crossexamine witnesses; (f) judgment to be
rendered upon the record thus made. In
the absence of statute laying down other
or more specific requirements, the above
conditions meet the demands of due
process. In the absence of specific provisions to the contrary, due process does
not require that any or all of these
requirements must be in writing or in
any particular form. In the interests of
orderly procedure and certainty as to its
proceedings and action taken, any legally
constituted body or agency should as far
as practical have written records of all
proceedings before it, except where otherwise provided by law. Christiansen v.
Harris, 109 U. 1, 163 P. 2d 314.
In the trial of criminal cases the statutes prescribe certain rules of procedure,
which must be substantially complied with
to keep the proceedings within the due
processes of the law. A somewhat different set of rules is prescribed in civil
cases and in special proceedings. Some
rules, affecting all types, are not found in
the statutes, but in that great basic body
of the law commonly known as the decisions or rules of the courts. But all these
methods and means provided for the protection and enforcement of human rights
have the same basic requirements—that
no party can be affected by such action,
until his legal rights have been the subject of an inquiry by a person or body
authorized by law to determine such
rights, of which inquiry the party has due
notice, and at which he had an opportunity to be heard and to give evidence as
to his rights or defenses. Christiansen v.
Harris, 109 U. 1, 163 P. 2d 314.
While normally we think of "due process of law" as requiring judicial action,
yet "due process" is not necessarily judicial action. Christiansen v. Harris, 109
U. 1, 163 P. 2d 314.
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Land Registration Act.
The Torrens Act was not unconstitutional as conferring judicial powers on
registrar of titles. Ashton-Jenkins Co. v.
Bramel, 56 U. 587, 192 P. 375, 11 A. L. E.
752.
Limitation of actions.
This section does not preclude the legislature from prescribing a statute of limitations for time within which to assail
the regularity or organization of an irrigation district. Horn v. Shaffer, 47 U. 55,
151 P. 555.
Occupational disease law.
Occupational Disease Disability Law, in
excluding compensation for partial disability from silicosis, and in rendering
remedy under that act exclusive so as to
abrogate common-law right of action
therefor, is not unconstitutional as depriving such employee of his remedy by due
course of law for injury done to his person. Masich v. United States Smelting,
R e t & Min. Co., 113 U. 101, 191 P. 2d 612.
Waiver of rights.
Right to apply to courts for redress of
wrong is substantial right, and will not
be waived by contract except through
unequivocal language. Bracken v. Dahle,
68 U. 486, 251 P. 16.
Workmen's compensation law.
Employers are entitled to have recourse
to courts under Workmen's Compensation
Sec. 12.

Act concerning question of their ultimate
liability. Industrial Comm. v. Evans, 52
U. 394, 174 P. 825.
Workmen's Compensation Act is not invalid because it delegates to industrial
commission the power to hear, consider
and determine controversies between litigants as to ultimate liability, or their
property rights. Utah Fuel Coe v. Industrial Comm., 57 U. 246, 194 P. 122.
Dependents of employee killed by acts
of third party, a stranger to employment,
are not limited to recovery under Workmen's Compensation Act exclusively, unless they have assigned their rights to
insurance carrier. Robinson v. Union Pac.
R. Co., 70 U. 441, 261 P. 9.
Collateral References.
Constitutional Law<§=>322, 324, 327, 328.
16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law §§ 709, 711,
714, 719.
16 Am. Jur. 2d 718-721, Constitutional
Law §§ 382-385.
Law Reviews.
The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens,
Edward L. Barrett, Jr., 35 Calif. L. Rev.
380.
The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens
in Anglo-American Law, Paxton Blair, 29
Colum. L. Rev. 1.
No-Fault Automobile Insurance in Utah
—State Constitutional Issues, 1970 Utah
L. Rev. 248.

[Rights of accused persons.]

In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear
and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf,
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person,
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Comparable Provision.
—acquittal notwithstanding defect in inMontana Const., Art. I l l , § 16.
formation or indictment, 77-24-12.
—acquittal or dismissal without judgCross-References.
ment, 77-24-11.
Defendant as witness, 77-44-5.
—acts punishable in different ways,
Double jeopardy, statutory provision, punishment limited to one, 76-1-23.
77-1-10.
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Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.]
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any franchise, privilege
or immunity.
Comparable Provision,
Montana Const., Art. I l l , § 11.
Alcoholic beverages.
Former Liquor Control Act held not unconstitutional as violative of this section.
Utah Manufacturers' Assn. v. Stewart,
82 U. 198, 23 P. 2d 229.
State legislature was acting within its
power in enacting Liquor Control Act,
which in effect revoked previously granted
license authorizing the sale of light beer.
Eiggins v. District Court of Salt Lake
County, 89 U. 183, 51 P. 2d 645.
Pioneer Memorial Building.
Act pertaining to leasing of portion of
state capitol grounds to Daughters of
Utah Pioneers for erection and maintenance of Pioneer Memorial Building, and
amendments thereto making appropriations therefor, as well as appropriation of

$150,000 for that building, were not violative of this section. Thomas v. Daughters of Utah Pioneers, 114 U. 108, 197
P. 2d 477, appeal dismissed for want of a
properly presented substantial federal
question, 336 U. S. 930, 93 L. Ed. 1090,
69 S. Ct. 739.
Collateral References.
Franchises<§=>ll.
37 C.J.S. Franchises § 26.
36 Am. Jur. 2d 733-745, Franchises
§§9-23.
Competition by grantor of nonexclusive
franchise, or provision therefor, as violation of constitutional rights of franchise
holder, 114 A. L. R. 192.
Inclusion of different franchise rights
or purposes in same ordinance, 127 A. L.
R. 1049.

Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.
Cross-Reference.
Prohibition on private or special laws,
Const., Art. VI, §26.
In general.
All laws shall operate uniformly wherever uniform laws can be enacted. State
v. Holtgreve, 58 U. 563, 200 P. 894, 26
A. L. R. 696.
Objects and purposes of law present
touchstone for determining proper and
improper classifications. State v. Mason,
94 U. 501, 78 P. 2d 920, 117 A. L. R. 330;
State v. J. B. & R. E. Walker, Inc., 100
U. 523, 116 P. 2d 766.
One who assails legislative classification as arbitrary has burden of proving
it to be such. State v. J. B. & R. E. Walker, Inc., 100 U. 523, 116 P. 2d 766.
Classification is never unreasonable or
arbitrary in its inclusion or exclusion
features so long as there is some basis for
differentiation between classes or subject
matters included, as compared to those
excluded, provided differentiation bears
reasonable relation to purposes of act.
State v. J. B. & R. E. Walker, Inc., 100
U. 523, 116 P. 2d 766.
Before legislative enactment can be interfered with, court must be able to say
that there is no fair reason for the law
that would not require equally its extension to those which it leaves untouched.

State v. J. B. & R. E. Walker, Inc., 100
U. 523, 116 P. 2d 766.
Only where some persons or transactions excluded from operation of law are,
as to the subject matter of the law, in
no differentiable class from those included in its operation, is the law
discriminatory in the sense of being arbitrary and unconstitutional, and if reasonable basis to differentiate can be found,
law must be held constitutional. State v.
J. B. & R. E. Walker, Inc., 100 U. 523, 116
P. 2d 766.
Inability of legislature to make perfect
classification does not render statute unconstitutional. State v. J. B. & R. E.
Walker, Inc., 100 U. 523, 116 P. 2d 766.
In determining whether classification
made by legislature is unconstitutional,
discrimination is very essence of classification and is not objectionable unless
founded upon unreasonable distinctions.
Gronlund v. Salt Lake City, 113 U. 284,
194 P. 2d 464.
An act is never unconstitutional because of discrimination as long as there is
some reasonable basis for differentiation
between classes which is related to the
purposes to be accomplished by the act,
and it applies uniformly to all persons
within the class. Hansen v. Public Employees' Retirement System Board of Administration, 122 U. 44, 246 P. 2d 591.
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practice law and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to practice
law.
Repeals and Reenactments. — See the
Compiler's Note following the analysis at the
beginning of this article Former Article VIE
contains no comparable provisions.
Cross-References. — Supreme Court rule-

making process, Rule 11-101, Code of Judicial
Administration.
Cited in Stewart v Coffman, 748 P.2d 579
(Utah Ct. App 1988).

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER PROVISIONS
ANALYSIS

Judge pro tempore
Regulation of practice of law.
Judge pro tempore.
Appointment of a judge pro tempore to hear
and decide a divorce action does not violate the
provisions of § 30-3-4, since a properly appointed pro tempore judge becomes the equal
in every respect to the regular judge Harward
v Harward, 526 P2d 1183 (Utah 1974).
Circuit judge appointed by state court ad-

ministrator to serve temporarily as a district
judge pursuant to § 78-3-24 and former
§ 78-4-15 was not a judge pro tempore and was
not subject to the legal restrictions pertaining
to that status. Cahoon v Cahoon, 641 P 2d 140
(Utah 1982)
Regulation of practice of law.
Inherent in the judicial power conferred on
the Supreme Court by former Article VIII, sec
1, of the Utah Constitution is the power to regulate the practice of law In re Utah State Bar
Petition, 647 P 2d 991 (Utah 1982).

Sec. 5. [Jurisdiction of district court and other courts —
Right of appeal.]
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as
limited by this constitution or by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary
writs. The district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute. The jurisdiction of all other courts, both original and appellate, shall be
provided by statute. Except for matters filed originally with the supreme
court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the court of original
jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause.
merits, after a full and adequate opportunity
has been afforded all parties to present their
arguments, and does not deny an appellant his
right of appeal Hernandez v Hayward, 764
P2d 993 (Utah Ct App 1988)

Repeals and Reenactments. — See the
Compiler's Note following the analysis at the
beginning of this article See former Art VIII,
Secb 7, 8 and 9 in the bound volume for the
former provisions comparable to this section

Cited in Heninger v Ninth Circuit Court,
739 P2d 1108 (Utah (1987), DeBry v Salt
Lake County Bd of Appeals, 764 P 2d 627
(Utah Ct App 1988)
A.L.R. — Place where claim or cause of action "arose" under state venue statute, 53
A.LR.4th 1104

ANALYSIS

Summary appellate disposition.
Cited
Summary appellate disposition.
Summary affirmance under Rule 10, Ct.
App. R., is a determination of the appeal on its

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER PROVISIONS
nated in circuit court.
Appeal to Supreme Court where case originated in justice or city court.
Defendant's right to appeal
Divorce decree

ANALYSIS

Appeal to Supreme Court by the state in criminal cases.
Appeal to Supreme Court where case origi-
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AMENDMENTS
TO THE

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
AMENDMENT I
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.
AMENDMENT II
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.
AMENDMENT i n
No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without
the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be
prescribed by law.
AMENDMENT IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
AMENDMENT V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.
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AMEND. X I V , § 5

AMENDMENT XIV
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
Section 2.
Bepresentatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons
in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote
at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President
of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and
Judicial OflScers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is
denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years
of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except
for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation
therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male
citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years
of age in such State.
Section 3.
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector
of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under
the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken
an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States,
or as a member of any State legislature or as an executive or judicial
officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States,
shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given
aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of twothirds of each House, remove such disability.
Section 4.
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by
law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for
services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned.
But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt
or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the
United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave;
but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal and void.
Section 5.
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article.
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